721 F.Supp.3d 56
D. Me.2024Background:
- Bar Harbor voters adopted an initiative ordinance (Chapter 125, §125-77) capping disembarkations from cruise vessels to 1,000 persons per day (wording initially said “persons”); adoption followed local concerns about waterfront congestion and quality of life.
- Plaintiffs: local pier owners, tender-boat LLCs, tourism businesses, and APPLL; Intervenor‑Plaintiff: Penobscot Bay & River Pilots Association; Defendant: Town of Bar Harbor; Intervenor‑Defendant: Charles Sidman (initiative co‑author).
- Pier owners operate private piers with Coast Guard approvals; pilots board large vessels offshore and pilot to Frenchman Bay anchorages; pilotage and many maritime matters are federally and state regulated; CruiseMaine and MOAs previously limited passengers voluntarily.
- Town suspended enforcement pending litigation; bench trial held; evidence showed substantial local congestion on cruise‑call days and that most large cruise ships exceed the 1,000 cap.
- Court ruled the ordinance a valid exercise of Maine home‑rule authority, rejected plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause and substantive due process claims, but held the ordinance is partially preempted under federal maritime security rules to the extent it would bar shore access for seafarers (crew/pilots).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| State preemption / Maine home‑rule | Ordinance conflicts with state pilotage and economic development objectives | Municipal home rule is broad; statutes don't expressly/impliedly prohibit local limits on disembarkation | Home‑rule upheld; no implied state preemption of the ordinance |
| Federal preemption / Supremacy Clause (maritime & security regs) | Federal maritime regime and port/security rules preempt local limits and require uniform access | Ordinance regulates landward disembarkation and does not conflict with federal vessel/navigation rules | Mostly no field or conflict preemption; limited conflict preemption only as to seafarers’ shore access under 33 C.F.R. §105.237 (town must exempt seafarers) |
| Substantive Due Process | 1,000‑person flat, year‑round cap is irrational and arbitrary (not based on study) | Cap is a rational local measure to address congestion/quality‑of‑life; courts should defer | Due process claim rejected; rational‑basis review satisfied; ordinance not arbitrary or discriminatory |
| Dormant Commerce Clause | Ordinance discriminates against maritime/foreign commerce and unduly burdens interstate/foreign commerce | Regulation is non‑discriminatory, local and even‑handed, aimed at local welfare; burdens commerce only incidentally | Commerce Clause claim rejected; no protectionism; Pike balancing finds burdens not clearly excessive vs. local benefits |
Key Cases Cited
- Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (discussing preemption principles and statutory conflict analysis)
- City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (field preemption requires pervasive federal scheme)
- Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (warning against broad inferences of federal preemption)
- Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (purpose of Congress guides preemption scope)
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (federalism concerns in preemption analysis)
- West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (legislative supervision and limits on freedom to contract)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (balancing test for nondiscriminatory local regulations affecting interstate commerce)
- National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (anti‑discrimination principle and limits on dormant Commerce Clause overrides)
- Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (commerce‑clause concern where local law effectively halts interstate transit)
- United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida‑Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (states retain traditional police‑power authority to regulate for local welfare)