Background - California enacted a law (Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25980–25984) banning force-feeding birds to enlarge their livers and banning the in-state sale of products resulting from that practice (section 25982); the law targeted the production method, not the food product itself, and had a long grace period before effective date. - Plaintiffs (out-of-state and Canadian foie gras producers and a California restaurant) produce and sell foie gras made via force-feeding and sued after the sales ban took effect, alleging preemption by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). - The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment, holding section 25982 was expressly preempted by the PPIA’s bar on state "ingredient requirements." The district court permanently enjoined enforcement. - On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the PPIA preempted the California sales ban (express preemption and implied field/obstacle preemption theories). - The Ninth Circuit held the PPIA’s phrase "ingredient requirements" refers to physical composition of poultry products (ingredients), not animal husbandry or feeding methods, and concluded section 25982 is not expressly or impliedly preempted. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Whether the PPIA’s express preemption of "ingredient requirements" bars California §25982 | Section 25982 effectively imposes an ingredient requirement by banning foie gras made from force-fed birds | §25982 regulates production methods/animal treatment, not physical ingredients, so it is outside the PPIA ingredient preemption | Held: Not expressly preempted — "ingredient requirements" means physical components, not feeding practices | | Whether the PPIA implicitly occupies the field of poultry products (field preemption) | Congress intended comprehensive federal regulation that leaves no room for state bans on products derived from certain practices | PPIA expressly contemplates and preserves extensive state roles; it did not occupy the field | Held: No field preemption; PPIA does not foreclose state regulation of animal treatment or bans on particular products | | Whether §25982 creates a conflict/obstacle to PPIA objectives (obstacle preemption) | A state sales ban frustrates PPIA's goals of uniform regulation of poultry products | §25982 targets pre-slaughter treatment far removed from PPIA’s regulation of slaughter/processing and labeling; it does not obstruct PPIA enforcement | Held: No obstacle preemption; state law does not frustrate PPIA’s purposes | | Whether National Meat Ass'n v. Harris controls to preempt §25982 | Plaintiffs: National Meat shows a state sales ban tied to animal-treatment mandates can be preempted | State: National Meat addressed slaughterhouse practices and the FMIA’s premises/operations clause, not ingredient preemption of feeding methods | Held: National Meat distinguishable; that case involved direct regulation of slaughterhouses’ operations, unlike this law | ### Key Cases Cited Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (Congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone in preemption analysis) Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (presumption against preemption of state police powers unless clear and manifest) Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (interpret express preemption clause according to its substance and scope) National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012) (state law regulating slaughterhouse operations can be preempted under FMIA when it intrudes on federally regulated activities) Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007) (FMIA does not preempt state bans on particular meats sold for human consumption) Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007) (state prohibition on slaughter of certain animals operates at a remove from federal inspection/labeling scheme and is not preempted)