Association Des Eleveurs De Canards Et D'Oies Du Quebec v. Harris
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18154
9th Cir.2013Background
- Foie gras produced by gavage involves force-feeding ducks via a tube to enlarge livers; California § 25982 bans sale of products produced by force feeding a bird to enlarge liver beyond normal size (effective July 1, 2012).
- Plaintiffs are non-California producers/restaurateurs (Canadian Farmers, Hudson Valley, Hot’s Kitchen) challenging § 25982 as applied to foie gras sales in California.
- § 25981 prohibits force feeding in California; § 25982 bans sale of products resulting from force feeding, regardless of where force feeding occurred; both enacted to reform practice and address cruelty concerns.
- Statutory history shows the act was intended to prohibit force feeding; the district court denied a preliminary injunction; the Ninth Circuit affirms, holding scope limited to foie gras and rejecting due process and commerce-clause challenges.
- Court proceedings centered on Eleventh Amendment immunity, scope of § 25982, due process vagueness and notice, and dormant Commerce Clause analysis under Pike and related First principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of § 25982 | § 25982 bans all products from force-fed birds. | § 25982 bans products produced by force-feeding to enlarge liver; foie gras only for this record. | § 25982 limited to products produced by force feeding to enlarge liver; foie gras only in dispute. |
| Eleventh Amendment Immunity | State cannot be sued; Ex Parte Young exception applies. | Governor immune; Attorney General may be sued for prospective relief. | Attorney General not entitled to immunity; district court denial affirmed; state and governor dismissed. |
| Due Process Vagueness/Notice | Definition of force feeding vague; lack of fair notice. | statute provides objective standards; gavage defined; “for the purpose of” interpreted objectively. | Statute not vague; provides fair notice; challenged due process claim rejected. |
| Commerce Clause | § 25982 discriminates against interstate commerce and directly regulates it. | Not discriminatory; applies to all alike; does not directly regulate interstate commerce; Pike analysis favors validity. | Not discriminatory; does not directly regulate interstate commerce; burden not clearly excessive; statute sustained. |
Key Cases Cited
- United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (dormant Commerce Clause and even-handed regulation)
- C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (discrimination against interstate commerce analysis)
- Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (Ex Parte Young enforcement power over state officials)
- NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (direct regulation of interstate commerce; uniform national standards)
- Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) (direct regulation of nationwide market and uniform production issues)
- Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (price-control/price-affirmation concerns; not controlling here)
- Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (price-control concerns; not controlling here)
- Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standards)