Ashley Judd v. Harvey Weinstein, 967 F.3d 952

Background:

In 1996–97 Ashley Judd met Harvey Weinstein at the Peninsula Hotel in a private hotel room; Weinstein allegedly made sexual requests (massage, watching him shower) and Judd rebuffed him and left.
Judd had previously worked on a Miramax film and sought to develop a professional relationship with Weinstein; she later met privately with Peter Jackson and Fran Walsh about roles in The Lord of the Rings.
Weinstein allegedly told Jackson and Walsh that Miramax had a “bad experience” with Judd and that she was “a nightmare to work with,” and as a result Jackson and Walsh did not cast Judd.
Judd filed suit in 2018 asserting defamation, sexual harassment under California Civil Code § 51.9 (1996 version), intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and UCL violations; the district court dismissed the § 51.9 claim with prejudice.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit assumed Judd’s factual allegations were true, analyzed whether a producer–actor relationship falls within § 51.9’s scope (the statute covers business/service/professional relationships substantially similar to enumerated examples), and reversed dismissal of the § 51.9 claim, remanding for further proceedings.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a producer–actor relationship falls within § 51.9 as a “business, service, or professional relationship” substantially similar to the statute’s examples	§51.9 covers producer–actor relationships because such relationships have an inherent power imbalance and gatekeeper coercive potential	§51.9’s enumerated examples are idiosyncratic and do not encompass producer–actor relationships	Court: Yes; the producer–actor relationship as alleged is substantially similar due to the power imbalance and gatekeeper role
Whether Judd adequately alleged a professional relationship with Weinstein at the time of the conduct	Judd alleged prior Miramax work, purpose of the hotel meeting was business development, and she was discussing potential Weinstein/Miramax roles	Weinstein contended no qualifying relationship existed at the time of the hotel encounter	Court: Allegations suffice to plead a business/professional relationship for §51.9 purposes
Whether §51.9 requires a fiduciary or only applies to relationships outside employment	§51.9 covers many non-fiduciary business relationships outside the traditional workplace; applicability depends on facts	District court read §51.9 as limited to relationships outside workplace/employment	Court: No fiduciary requirement; whether relationship is employment-related is a factual issue for the trier of fact; §51.9 can apply here
Whether the complaint met pleading standards to survive Rule 12(b)(6)	Judd pleaded the statute’s elements: relationship, unwelcome sexual advances and retaliation, inability to terminate without hardship, and economic harm	Weinstein argued facts were insufficient as a matter of law	Court: The complaint plausibly alleged §51.9 elements and dismissal was erroneous

Key Cases Cited

Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963 (Cal. 2009) (§51.9 covers a variety of business relationships outside the workplace)
C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1094 (2009) (nothing in §51.9 requires a fiduciary relationship)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim to survive dismissal)
Lewis v. Tel. Emps. Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal courts must predict how state supreme court would decide unsettled questions)
Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2017) (federal court guidance on ascertaining state law)
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991) (de novo review of district court’s determination of state law)
Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1995) (on appeal, courts presume well-pleaded allegations are true)
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018) (employment-status questions may be fact-dependent for trier of fact)