Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074

Post-9/11, al-Kidd sued Ashcroft under Bivens for alleged policy to detain terrorism suspects via material-witness warrants without probable cause.
Al-Kidd was arrested in March 2003 under a validated material-witness warrant and detained 16 days without being called as a witness.
Warrant application affidavit allegedly omitted that the government had no intention to use al-Kidd as a witness and misrepresented travel plans.
Ninth Circuit held that pretextual, nonprobable-cause arrests violate the Fourth Amendment and rejected Ashcroft’s immunity defenses.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address qualified immunity and the legality of the government’s use of the material-witness statute.
Majority reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding Ashcroft had qualified immunity and that the arrest was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Ashcroft have qualified immunity for the alleged pretextual use of a material-witness warrant?	al-Kidd argues no qualified immunity due to clearly established law on pretextual detention.	Ashcroft contends the law was not clearly established; officials may rely on reasonable beliefs.	Ashcroft entitled to qualified immunity.
Was the Fourth Amendment violated by detaining a material witness under a valid warrant for pretrial purposes based on alleged pretext?	al-Kidd contends pretext undermines reasonableness of arrest and detention.	Court held objective reasonableness governs; motive not required when warrant is valid and supported by individualized suspicion.	No Fourth Amendment violation found.
Should the Court decide whether the material-witness statute’s use for preventive detention was lawful in this context?	al-Kidd asserts broader illegality of the policy and its application.	Court limits decision to qualified-immunity issues; does not resolve statute’s validity here.	Question left unresolved; court proceeds on immunity ground.
Did existing precedent clearly establish a constitutional violation for pretextual detention under a material-witness warrant at the time of al-Kidd’s arrest?	circuits and district courts had suggested possible illegality; it was clearly established.	no clearly established law; need a robust consensus of persuasive authority.	No clearly established constitutional violation; qualified immunity applied.

Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996) (objective reasonableness governs; subjective motives generally irrelevant)
Edmond v. United States, 531 U. S. 32 (2001) (special-needs justification; programmatic purposes may affect reasonableness)
Knights v. United States, 534 U. S. 112 (2001) (limits on motive inquiry in reasonable-suspicion contexts)
Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334 (2000) (objective evaluation of searches without probable cause; not probing motives broadly)
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146 (2004) (objective standard; not broader motive inquiry)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987) (clearly established law requires a robust consensus for qualified immunity)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity when official conduct not clearly unconstitutional)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001) (two-step approach to qualified immunity analysis)
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 (1999) (fair warning; avoid broad, general statements as clearly established rule)
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531 (1985) (reasonable suspicion at border; individualized suspicion distinctions)
T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325 (1985) (school-d context; individualized suspicion sufficient for certain intrusions)
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (administrative inspections; reasonableness and particularity considerations)