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696 F.3d 454
5th Cir.
2012
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Background

  • Plaintiffs, local government officials, challenge Texas Open Meetings Act § 551.144 as First Amendment content-based, vague, and overbroad.
  • District court held § 551.144 constitutional: content-neutral, disclosure-focused, and passing intermediate scrutiny; alternative strict scrutiny not reached.
  • TOMA defines a 'meeting' broadly to include deliberations by a quorum; incidental, non-public-adjacent social functions are carved out.
  • Prosecution for private speech in closed meetings is a misdemeanor; violations carry fines and possible jail time.
  • Court reviews de novo and addresses whether Rangra en banc precedent is controlling; vacated opinions are non-precedential.
  • Court ultimately affirms district court: § 551.144 is content-neutral, not overbroad or vague, and treated as intermediate-scrutiny disclosure.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Is § 551.144 content-based or content-neutral? Plaintiffs assert content-based due to public policy speech. Defendant argues content-neutral purpose justifies restriction by time/place/manner. Content-neutral; intermediate scrutiny applies.
What level of scrutiny applies to § 551.144? Strict scrutiny should apply as content-based restriction. Intermediate scrutiny applies as a disclosure-based, content-neutral restriction. Intermediate scrutiny governs.
Is § 551.144 overbroad? Statute criminalizes substantial protected private speech in private meetings. Statute serves transparency and other legitimate governmental goals; not overbroad. Not overbroad.
Is § 551.144 unconstitutionally vague? Statute is too vague; requires training and predictability. Complexity does not equal vagueness; standards exist in TOMA jurisprudence. Not unconstitutionally vague.

Key Cases Cited

  • Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (content-neutral regulation justified by its purpose; not aimed at viewpoint.)
  • Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (disclosure rules subject to exacting scrutiny; burdens disclosure not speech.)
  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (disclosure regimes subject to less-than-strict scrutiny; speech not suppressed.)
  • Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (underinclusiveness and context of speech affect First Amendment analysis.)
  • Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (public access and openness aid free discussion of governmental affairs.)
  • Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (content neutrality and tailoring of time/place/manner restrictions.)
  • Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (substantial relation between regulation and government interest in speech cases.)
  • Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (disclosure-like restrictions and content considerations in national-security context.)
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Case Details

Case Name: Asgeirsson v. Texas Attorney General
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 25, 2012
Citations: 696 F.3d 454; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20068; 40 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2305; 2012 WL 4352400; 11-50441
Docket Number: 11-50441
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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    Asgeirsson v. Texas Attorney General, 696 F.3d 454