Arvin D. Rochell v. State of Mississippi
2016 Miss. LEXIS 543
| Miss. | 2016Background
- In 1992 Rochell was indicted for capital murder and arson; in 1994 he pleaded guilty to a reduced murder charge (life) and arson (20 years concurrent).
- Rochell filed a pro se petition (styled "Motion to Clarify Parole Eligibility") in 2015, claiming MDOC wrongly deemed him ineligible for the presumptive-parole process created by Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-18 (eff. July 1, 2014).
- Section 47-7-18(1) provides that an inmate eligible under § 47-7-3 "shall be released" on the parole-eligibility date without a board hearing if specified conditions (case plan, no recent serious violations, victim not requesting hearing, agreed conditions, approved discharge plan) are met.
- The trial court denied relief, finding the 2014 statutory scheme (including § 47-7-3.1 case-plan requirements) contemplates inmates admitted after July 1, 2014, and therefore Rochell (admitted in 1994) was not entitled to the new presumptive-parole process.
- The State argued § 47-7-18 does not apply retroactively to inmates sentenced before July 1, 2014; Rochell argued the statute’s plain language applies to all parole-eligible inmates regardless of sentencing date.
- The Court of Appeals (supreme court) affirmed, holding § 47-7-18 does not apply retroactively and therefore Rochell was not entitled to relief; the court did not reach Rochell’s due-process liberty-interest claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 47-7-18 applies retroactively to parole-eligible inmates sentenced before July 1, 2014 | § 47-7-18’s plain language ("Each inmate eligible for parole pursuant to § 47-7-3 shall be released…") mandates application to all parole-eligible inmates regardless of sentencing date | The 2014 amendments were not intended to apply retroactively; statutory context (case-plan requirement, definitions, preservation of other parole statutes) shows prospective application only | § 47-7-18 does not apply retroactively; affirmed denial of relief |
| Whether § 47-7-18(1) creates a due-process liberty interest | (alternative argument) The statute’s mandatory language creates a protected liberty interest | (State) Not reached in majority; argued statute does not entitle pre-2014 inmates to presumptive parole | Court declined to decide after resolving non-retroactivity question |
Key Cases Cited
- Rochell v. State, 748 So.2d 103 (Miss. 1999) (background conviction and sentencing)
- Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595 (Miss. 1999) (standard of review for post-conviction relief — factual findings vs. de novo legal questions)
- Tipton v. State, 150 So.3d 82 (Miss. 2014) (statutory interpretation is a question of law)
- Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So.2d 481 (Miss. 1966) (statutes are prospective unless legislature clearly intends retroactivity)
- Hudson v. Moon, 732 So.2d 927 (Miss. 1999) (reiterating rule favoring prospective construction unless clearest expression indicates otherwise)
- Tunica Cty. v. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC, 27 So.3d 1128 (Miss. 2009) (statutory construction rules; read statutes together to give effect to each)