Artis v. Bernanke
394 U.S. App. D.C. 84
| D.C. Cir. | 2011Background
- Appellants are a putative class of current and former African-American secretaries employed by the Federal Reserve Board alleging a Board-wide pattern of race discrimination in pay, bonuses, promotions, performance appraisals, training, facilities, leave practices, and work assignments under Title VII.
- The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, citing lack of counseling by the class.
- The Board regulations require counseling before filing an administrative complaint, and class claims may be counseled on behalf of the class under § 268.204(b).
- After Artis I, the secretaries pursued new group counseling sessions (Jan 15 and Feb 13, 1997) and submitted a group document 'Resubmission of Class-Action Complaint' identifying asserted discriminatory practices.
- Nine secretaries received individual counseling; EEOC/board counselors prepared reports based on notes from those sessions; the administrative process proceeded to dismissal and EEOC review before reaching district court.
- This appeal centers on whether the secretaries exhausted administrative remedies through counseling, allowing the district court to retain jurisdiction or whether dismissal was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counseling satisfied exhaustion for the class | Artis contends group/individual counseling sufficed. | Bernanke contends counseling was insufficient or untimely. | Counseling satisfied exhaustion for the class; district court vacated and remanded. |
| Scope of vicarious exhaustion for a class action | At least one class member exhausted, enabling class exhaustion. | Exhaustion must be shown for each member or not at all. | A single class agent can exhaust on behalf of the class. |
| Timeliness of exhaustion under 12 C.F.R. § 268.104(a) | Time limits were effectively satisfied by the counseling efforts. | Time-bar defense was not raised below and is waived on appeal. | Time-bar defense waived; not reach merits. |
| Good faith by counselees affecting exhaustion | Counselee cooperation was sufficient despite perceived prejudice. | Some obstruction suggested lack of good faith. | Even with some bad-faith conduct, counseling ample to meet the requirement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Artis v. Greenspan, 158 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (counseling must enable agency to investigate; class exhaustion permitted)
- Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (purpose of exhaustion is to informally resolve; not to build record)
- Blackmon-Malloy v. United States Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (counseling and mediation goals; class exhaustion possible via vicarious exhaustion)
- Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pattern-or-practice proof often relies on statistical comparisons)
- Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (issues of exhaustion and related pleading standards in class actions)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (Supreme Court 2006) (jurisdictional considerations; distinctions between jurisdiction and time limits)
- Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 614 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (nonjurisdictional exhaustion principles; Title VII context)
- Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (statutory time limits not jurisdictional; analogous exhaustion analysis)