Arroyo v. State
559 S.W.3d 484
Tex. Crim. App.2018Background
- Victim K.E., regarded Appellant as a family "uncle," was nine when the alleged incidents occurred; she testified at trial at age 18.
- Three separate incidents were described in which Appellant began by twirling her hair and rubbing her neck/chest, then moved to rubbing her leg and inserting his hand under her skirt and underwear to touch her vagina.
- K.E. used the word "chest" to describe where Appellant moved his hand before it went to her skirt; she did not explicitly say "breast."
- Trial court convicted Appellant of six indecency-with-a-child counts: three for touching genitals and three for touching breasts.
- Court of appeals affirmed the genital-touching convictions but reversed and rendered acquittal on the breast-touching counts, relying on Nelson v. State that "chest" may not mean "breast."
- The higher court reviewed sufficiency under Jackson v. Virginia, considered the statutory evolution of "sexual contact," and reversed the court of appeals, holding the evidence sufficient to support the breast-touching convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Appellant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence was legally sufficient to prove Appellant touched the victim's breasts | K.E.'s repeated description of conduct (hand down her chest then under skirt to vagina), consistency across three occasions, and victim's age at the time support a rational inference of breast-touching with sexual intent | K.E.'s use of the word "chest" is ambiguous; under Nelson the term may not mean "breast," so evidence is insufficient to prove breast-touching | Reversed court of appeals; evidence legally sufficient to support breast-touching convictions |
| Whether Nelson controls interpretation of "chest" vs. "breast" under modern statute | The modern Penal Code and legislative history remove age/gender limits and support reading "breast" in context; Nelson is distinguishable on facts | Nelson requires caution when a witness says "chest," so ambiguity defeats sufficiency absent clarification | Nelson distinguishable: here additional facts (progression to genitals, repetition, victim's age at time) allowed a rational jury to infer "breast" touching |
| Proper standard of review for sufficiency challenge | Jackson v. Virginia standard: view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution; consider cumulative force of evidence | Same standard applies; appellate court may not reweigh evidence | Jackson standard applied; appellate reversal for insufficiency was unwarranted |
| Use of extratextual sources (dictionary/legislative history) to resolve ambiguity between "breast" and "chest" | Legislative history and statutory amendments resolve gender/age ambiguity; factual context controls whether "chest" denotes breast | Reliance on dictionary distinctions like in Nelson undermines sufficiency where witness used "chest" | Court relied on statutory history and factual context to distinguish Nelson and uphold convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Nelson v. State, 505 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (held that a victim's statement that defendant "rubbed my chest" may not necessarily prove touching of a "breast")
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (establishes legal-sufficiency standard: view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (statutory construction limited to plain text unless ambiguous; legislative history may be consulted when text is ambiguous)
- Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reiterates Jackson sufficiency review and appellate constraints on reweighing evidence)