Armstrong v. State
340 S.W.3d 759
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2011Background
- Armstrong, indigent, was charged with aggravated assault with a knife and had court-appointed counsel after applying for a court-appointed attorney.
- Following indictment, Armstrong entered a negotiated plea with deferred adjudication for two years, later extended by two more years.
- The trial court adjudicated guilt and sentenced Armstrong to six years' imprisonment; fees were to be paid as conditions of probation but these were not referenced in the judgment by specific amounts.
- A clerk's bill of costs later listed $1,123 total, including $900 for attorney fees, and Armstrong did not contest the fees at that time.
- Over two years, supplemental probation orders reaffirmed payment of all court costs including court-appointed attorney fees, with additional fee requests and orders.
- A subsequent adjudication motion led to another appointment of counsel and a new $500 attorney-fee claim; the judge later approved it as a condition of probation.
- The Judgment Adjudicating Guilt left court-cost spaces blank but stated to pay costs as ordered; a second bill totaled $2,258 with $1,900 in attorney fees, which the district clerk prepared for appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether insufficient evidence to support attorney fees is a criminal-law matter | Armstrong argues it is a criminal-law issue. | State contends it concerns collection, a civil matter. | Criminal-law matter; merits must be addressed on direct appeal. |
| Whether a clerk's bill of costs can impose attorney fees without incorporation into the judgment | Armstrong asserts lack of incorporation undermines enforceability. | State argues statutes govern costs and bills are enforceable regardless of incorporation. | Attorney fees in a certified bill of costs are effective without being incorporated in the judgment. |
| Whether attorney fees are non-punitive costs and governed by Article 26.05(g) despite not being pronounced in the judgment | Armstrong contends insufficient evidence under 26.05(g) to support fees. | State maintains fees are civil-collection concerns and not part of punishment. | Attorney fees are non-punitive costs, governed by 26.05(g), and need not be orally pronounced. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (financial-resources inquiry central to cost reimbursement)
- Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2009) (withdrawal orders can be civil-collection but arise from criminal judgments)
- Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (court costs need not be orally pronounced to be effective)
- Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (criminal matters can involve civil-law issues in enforcement)
- Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (criminal-law matters include issues incident to criminal prosecutions)
- Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (defines criminal-law matter scope)
- Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (civil-law overlaps present but criminal matters prevail in jurisdictional analysis)