Armata v. Target Corp.
99 N.E.3d 788
Mass.2018Background
- Plaintiff Debra Armata incurred a past-due Target card debt and received multiple Target telephone calls in 2015 seeking payment.
- Target used a predictive dialer; most answered calls reached a live agent, but some played a prerecorded message only after answer when no agent was available.
- Target did not leave voicemail messages as a matter of internal policy, though it could have.
- Armata sued under Massachusetts debt-collection regulations (940 C.M.R. § 7.04(1)(f)), alleging Target initiated more than two telephone communications in a seven-day period.
- The trial court granted Target summary judgment, ruling unanswered calls that left no voicemail were not "communications"; the Supreme Judicial Court vacated that ruling and remanded, granting Armata summary judgment on liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "initiating a communication via telephone" includes predictive-dialer calls and unanswered calls | Initiation includes any attempted telephonic contact to convey information; unanswered calls by predictive dialer count if creditor could reach or leave voicemail | Predictive-dialer calls do not qualify unless a prerecorded message actually played; unanswered/no-voicemail calls are not "communications" | Regulation covers attempts to contact by telephone (including predictive dialers) when creditor can reach the debtor or leave voicemail; unanswered calls where creditor could reach/leave voicemail count as initiated communications |
| Whether Target falls within the Attorney General’s "truly unable to reach or leave a message" exemption | Exemption inapplicable because Target could reach Armata and could have left voicemail | Exempt because Target claims practical/legal constraints (state regs or FDCPA) prevented leaving voicemail | Exemption unavailable: Target was not truly unable to leave voicemail and was not barred by the FDCPA (Target is a creditor collecting its own account) |
| Whether technology (predictive dialer) creates a loophole avoiding regulation | Regulation’s purpose (prevent harassment) applies regardless of dialing tech; technological form irrelevant | Use of predictive dialer (live rep often on line; prerecorded message only sometimes) means regulation shouldn’t apply like to ‘‘robocalls’’ | Technology does not exempt creditor; regulation limits frequency of initiated telephonic attempts irrespective of dialing method |
| Whether voluntary decision not to leave voicemail avoids regulation | Voluntary non-leaving of voicemail still initiates communications and can harass; AG guidance rejects that practice | If creditor chooses not to leave messages, calls lacking conveyed info are not communications | Voluntary refusal to leave voicemail does not exempt creditor; AG guidance and enforcement treat that practice as unlawful |
Key Cases Cited
- Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117 (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346 (viewing evidence against party against whom judgment entered when both move for summary judgment)
- DeWolfe v. Hingham Ctr., Ltd., 464 Mass. 795 (de novo review of summary judgment legal questions)
- Warcewicz v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 410 Mass. 548 (interpretation of regulations like statutes)
- Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497 (use of dictionary definitions to ascertain plain meaning)
- Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 118 (grammatical construction: modifier confined to last antecedent)
- Biogen IDEC MA, Inc. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174 (deference to agency interpretations not arbitrary or inconsistent)
- Ybarra v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 635 (5th Cir.) (TCPA requires prerecorded voice actually play for liability under that statute)
- Chiang v. Verizon New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 26 (debt collectors vs. creditors distinction under FDCPA)