Armando Villanueva v. State of California, 986 F.3d 1158

Background

On July 3, 2016 two plain‑clothes officers in an unmarked sedan located a sideshow; a red Chevrolet Silverado driven by Villanueva (with Orozco as passenger) left the lot and was followed by the officers.
After a brief flight on surface streets the Silverado stopped near two dead‑end streets; the officers exited their vehicle with firearms drawn about 15–20 feet from the truck.
Villanueva executed a slow three‑point turn; within a second the officers fired at the Silverado, killing Villanueva and wounding Orozco; the truck then rolled slowly into the officers’ car.
Plaintiffs sued under § 1983 for excessive force (Fourth Amendment) and related state claims; the district court denied the officers’ summary‑judgment motion on qualified immunity for the excessive‑force claims.
On interlocutory appeal the Ninth Circuit considered (1) whether a passenger struck by force aimed at stopping a vehicle is "seized" under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether shooting at a slow‑moving vehicle that officers could have stepped aside from violated clearly established law.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity on the excessive‑force claims, holding (inter alia) that the passenger was seized and that precedents (notably Acosta and Orn) clearly established that shooting at a slow‑moving vehicle that an officer could avoid by stepping aside is unreasonable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a passenger struck by force aimed at stopping a vehicle is "seized" under the Fourth Amendment	Orozco: yes—intentional use of force to stop the vehicle seizes everyone inside (Brendlin/Brower)	Officers: no—seizure requires intent to seize that person or knowledge of passenger	Held: Seizure occurred; intent to stop the car is an intentional means of seizure and knowledge of a passenger is not required (Brendlin/Brower applied)
Whether shooting at the slow‑moving Silverado constituted excessive (deadly) force	Plaintiffs: vehicle was moving very slowly, not accelerating toward officers; they could have stepped aside, so shooting was unreasonable	Officers: truck posed imminent deadly threat given the prior chase; testimony that driver accelerated toward them	Held: Construing disputed facts for plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find force excessive; summary judgment on reasonableness denied
Whether the unlawfulness of shooting at a slow‑moving vehicle was "clearly established" (qualified immunity)	Plaintiffs: Acosta (and Orn reaffirming it) clearly established that shooting at a slow‑moving car that could be avoided by stepping aside is unlawful	Officers: governing precedent is general (Graham/Garner); some cases (e.g., Wilkinson) justify immunity in certain slow‑speed contexts	Held: Law was clearly established by Acosta and Orn; officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive‑force claim
Whether qualified immunity was preserved for detention/false‑arrest claims on appeal	Plaintiffs: N/A (claims proceeded)	Officers: sought immunity on those claims on appeal	Held: Officers waived qualified immunity for detention/false‑arrest claims by failing to raise it below; appellate review declined on that ground

Key Cases Cited

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (passengers are seized during traffic stops; seizure test is objective)
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (a seizure occurs when government intentionally applies means to terminate movement)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force as a seizure governed by Fourth Amendment reasonableness; allowed only where suspect poses threat of serious harm)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective‑reasonableness standard for excessive‑force claims)
Acosta v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996) (shooting at a slowly moving car that an officer could avoid by stepping aside is unreasonable and not protected by qualified immunity)
Orn v. City of Tacoma, 949 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2020) (reaffirming Acosta where a slow‑moving vehicle could have been avoided and denying qualified immunity)
Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (officers intentionally fired projectiles into a crowd; bystanders struck were seized)
Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishable slow‑speed context where vehicle was revving on slippery ground and posed imminent risk)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (use of force in dangerous car chases may be reasonable in different circumstances)
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (Supreme Court on clearly established law—need for precedent to ‘‘squarely govern’’ particular facts)