Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6256
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) is an executive program (2012) that grants certain undocumented immigrants renewable two-year deferred action and federal employment authorization (EADs) but not formal immigration status.
- Arizona issued Executive Order 2012-06 directing state agencies to deny public benefits and state ID (including driver’s licenses) to DACA recipients, and ADOT adopted a policy refusing to accept DACA-coded EADs ((c)(33)) as proof of "authorized presence." ADOT continued to accept other EAD categories ((c)(9), (c)(10)).
- Plaintiffs (five individual DACA recipients and the Arizona DREAM Act Coalition) sued, alleging violation of the Equal Protection Clause and federal preemption (Supremacy Clause); district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction; defendants appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: it agreed DACA recipients are similarly situated to other EAD holders and, invoking constitutional avoidance, rested its decision on federal preemption—Arizona impermissibly created its own immigration classification of "authorized presence," intruding on the INA’s exclusive federal field.
- The court declined to rule on the constitutional validity of DACA itself, noting that preemption/displacement of Arizona’s policy does not depend on DACA’s ultimate validity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DACA recipients are similarly situated to other EAD-holders for Equal Protection | DACA recipients are similarly situated to other noncitizens who rely on EADs; disparate treatment lacks rational basis | DACA recipients differ because deferred action is executive discretion and is not relief under the INA like (c)(9)/(c)(10) categories | Court: DACA recipients are similarly situated in all relevant respects; Arizona’s distinction likely fails rational-basis review (but court avoided deciding on Equal Protection) |
| Whether Arizona’s policy is preempted by federal immigration law (Supremacy/INA) | Arizona’s policy creates a state immigration classification of "authorized presence," intruding on Congress/Executive authority over alien classification | Arizona contends states may set standards for state benefits and rely on REAL ID language; argues DACA lacks force of law | Held: Policy preempted—states may not invent classifications inconsistent with federal immigration scheme; Arizona’s definition departs from federal classifications and is displaced by INA |
| Whether this case requires assessing DACA’s constitutionality or Executive authority | Plaintiffs avoid challenging DACA’s constitutionality; they argue only state policy is unlawful | Arizona contends DACA exceeds Executive power and thus federal support for EADs is inadequate to require states to accept them | Court: Declined to resolve DACA constitutionality; explained INA and administrative precedent support Executive discretion to grant deferred action, but the question was unnecessary to decide here |
| Whether plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunctive relief | Plaintiffs: denial of licenses causes irreparable harm (career, education, mobility); no adequate remedy at law; balance favors injunction | Arizona: policy justified by state interests (liability, fraud prevention, administrative burden, consistency) | Held: Permanent injunction affirmed — plaintiffs showed irreparable harm, inadequate legal remedies, equitable balance and public interest favor injunctive relief; state interests did not justify preempted policy |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal government has broad authority over immigration; federal framework can preempt state law)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (States have no power to classify aliens for immigration purposes; Equal Protection analysis regarding aliens)
- Reno v. American–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (agency prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement is committed to the Executive)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agency decisions not to prosecute or enforce are generally committed to agency discretion)
- Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (animus toward a politically unpopular group is not a legitimate governmental interest)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Equal Protection principle that persons similarly situated should be treated alike)
- Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010) (four-factor test for permanent injunction; irreparable harm requirement)
- ADAC v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (Ninth Circuit preliminary injunction opinion holding Arizona policy likely violated Equal Protection and that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm)