81 F. Supp. 3d 795
D. Ariz.2015Background
- In 2012 DHS created DACA, granting eligible "DREAMers" deferred action for two years and Employment Authorization Documents (EADs); DACA does not confer lawful status or a path to citizenship.
- Arizona law (A.R.S. § 28-3153(D)) requires proof that an applicant’s presence is authorized under federal law to obtain a driver’s license; before DACA Arizona MVD accepted all EADs as proof of authorized presence.
- After DACA, Arizona (ADOT/MVD) changed policy to refuse to accept (c)(33) EADs issued under DACA as proof of authorized presence; later it also excluded (c)(14) and (a)(11) categories while continuing to accept other EAD categories, including (c)(9) and (c)(10).
- Plaintiffs (Arizona Dream Act Coalition and six DACA recipients) sued, claiming the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause; the Ninth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction and found plaintiffs likely to succeed on equal protection grounds (Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer).
- On summary judgment the district court found DACA recipients similarly situated to other EAD holders (e.g., (c)(9), (c)(10), parolees) and held Arizona’s disparate treatment fails even the Ninth Circuit’s rigorous form of rational-basis review.
- The court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Arizona from refusing to accept DACA-issued EADs as proof of authorized presence for driver’s licenses and ID cards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DACA recipients are similarly situated to other EAD holders who may obtain licenses | DACA recipients, like (c)(9)/(c)(10) applicants and parolees, have federal authorization to remain and work and are similarly situated in relevant respects | DACA recipients differ because their authorization is discretionary (deferred action), not statutory, and thus are not similarly situated | Court: DACA recipients are similarly situated to other EAD holders in relevant respects and were treated disparately |
| Level of scrutiny applicable to the Equal Protection claim | Plaintiffs argued heightened scrutiny may apply but that policy fails any standard | Defendants urged deferential rational-basis review | Court: Bound by Ninth Circuit’s approach; applied the Ninth Circuit’s more rigorous form of rational-basis review used in ADAC |
| Whether Arizona’s distinction between DACA EADs and other EADs is rationally related to a legitimate state interest | Plaintiffs: State offered no evidence tying exclusion of DACA recipients to a legitimate, rational interest | Defendants: Justifications include uncertainty over DACA legality, liability if DACA revoked, prevention of improper benefit access, administrative burden, and public safety/financial responsibility concerns | Court: Defendants’ justifications unsupported by evidence and inconsistent (e.g., state issues licenses to (c)(9)/(c)(10) despite same risks); distinction fails even under the ADAC rational-basis analysis |
| Scope of relief — classwide vs. named plaintiffs | Plaintiffs (Coalition) sought relief for all DACA recipients and members | Defendants argued injunction should be limited to named plaintiffs | Court: Injunction applies to all DACA recipients because Coalition sued on behalf of its members and practical administration requires a broad remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (U.S. 2012) (federal government has broad, plenary power over immigration)
- Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1999) (recognizing deferred action as prosecutorial discretion)
- Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (Ninth Circuit granted preliminary injunction and applied rigorous rational-basis review)
- Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (U.S. 2008) (standards for injunctive relief)
- eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (U.S. 2006) (four-factor test for permanent injunctions)
- Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1993) (traditional formulation of rational-basis review presumption)
- Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (preliminary injunction phase legal conclusions bind district court on the law)
- Zepeda v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985) (injunctions ordinarily limited to named plaintiffs absent class certification)
