Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Janice Brewer, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12746

Background

In 2012 DHS announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), permitting certain childhood-arrival noncitizens to remain and obtain employment authorization (renewable two-year deferred action; EADs issued with code (c)(33)).
Arizona law bars issuance of driver’s licenses to applicants who cannot show their presence is "authorized under federal law." The Arizona MVD had accepted federal Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) as proof of authorized presence until August 2012.
Governor Brewer issued an executive order directing state agencies to deny state ID (including driver’s licenses) to DACA beneficiaries; Arizona revised MVD policy to refuse to accept EADs bearing (c)(33) (and later also (c)(14) and (a)(11)).
Plaintiffs (five Arizona DACA recipients and an advocacy organization) sued, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause and federal preemption; they sought a preliminary injunction to require Arizona to accept their DACA-issued EADs for driver’s licenses.
The district court found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on equal protection but denied a preliminary injunction for lack of irreparable harm; Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on equal protection and likely to suffer irreparable harm, and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Equal Protection — disparate treatment	Arizona treats DACA recipients differently than similarly situated noncitizens (e.g., holders of (c)(9)/(c)(10) EADs) without a rational basis.	Arizona may distinguish DACA recipients because they are not on a "path to lawful status" and thus are not "authorized" to be present.	Court: DACA recipients are similarly situated to (c)(9)/(c)(10) holders; Arizona lacks a rational basis for disparate treatment -> Plaintiffs likely to succeed.
Federal Preemption (conflict / field)	Arizona policy frustrates federal objectives (Executive's determination to authorize work for DACA recipients) and creates a conflicting state classification of "authorized presence."	State may define "authorized presence" for state benefits like driver’s licenses; no conflict with federal law.	Court: Conflict-preemption theory plausible; concurrence would also find state policy likely preempted as an impermissible state regulation/classification of immigration.
Irreparable Harm	Denial of licenses irreparably harms Plaintiffs’ employment, career development, and opportunity; damages inadequate.	Plaintiffs can drive illegally or pursue alternative transport; harm is not irreparable.	Court: Harm to employment prospects, youth and socioeconomic position make injury irreparable; district court erred in requiring a heightened ("extreme") showing.
Type of Injunction / Status Quo	Plaintiffs seek prohibitory relief restoring the pre-DACA status quo where EADs were accepted; injunction not "mandatory."	Defendants contend injunction would be mandatory and require heightened showing.	Court: Relief is prohibitory (prevents enforcement of new policy); ordinary preliminary-injunction standards apply.

Key Cases Cited

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for preliminary injunctions).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection: similarly situated analysis and rational-basis review).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (alienage classifications and scrutiny rules).
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal supremacy in immigration regulation; limits on state regulation).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (animus toward a politically unpopular group is not a legitimate governmental interest).
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (preemption analysis considers practical effects of state law).
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (distinguishing mere state laws affecting aliens from impermissible regulation of immigration)