Arizona Democratic Party v. Katie Hobbs, 976 F.3d 1081

Arizona requires early (absentee) ballots to be returned with a signed ballot affidavit and requires receipt by 7:00 PM on Election Day for counting. (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-548(A), 16-552(B)).
If an affidavit is insufficient (including missing signature), polling officials disallow the ballot; Arizona historically allowed curing missing/defective signatures only up to Election Day.
Plaintiffs (Arizona Democratic Party and others) challenged the Election-Day signature deadline; the district court enjoined the deadline and ordered a five-day post-election cure period for unsigned ballots.
Arizona appealed and moved for a stay of the district court’s injunction pending appeal, arguing administrative burdens and the state's interest in orderly, timely elections.
The Ninth Circuit considered the standard for a stay (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, injury to others, public interest) and analyzed the case under the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of Arizona’s Election-Day signature deadline for early ballots	Deadline prevents otherwise-valid votes when voters omit signatures; district court ordered 5-day cure	Deadline imposes only minimal, nondiscriminatory burden and reasonably advances important state interests in orderly, timely administration and fraud prevention	Stay granted; State likely to succeed on the merits under Anderson-Burdick and deadline may be upheld
Whether the State’s limited 5-day cure for signature "mismatches" undermines rejecting cure for missing signatures	The mismatch exception shows arbitrary denial of cure for missing signatures	Distinction is rational: mismatch may be no fault of voter; missing signature is voter’s fault and imposes greater administrative cost to cure post-election	Court accepts State’s rational explanation; distinction supports State’s position
Proper legal framework: procedural due process vs. Anderson-Burdick	Plaintiffs raised a procedural due process theory to attack the rule	Voting restrictions should be evaluated under the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework, not a separate due process test	Court indicates State likely to prevail because Anderson-Burdick governs voting-rights burdens

Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (stay factors and sliding-scale balancing in preliminary-relief context)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (standards for stay pending appeal)
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (Anderson-Burdick framework for evaluating ballot-access restrictions)
De La Fuente v. Padilla, 930 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2019) (application of Anderson-Burdick in Ninth Circuit)
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (state harm where courts bar elections under permissible statutes)
Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (principle against changing election rules on eve of election)
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam principle cautioning last-minute changes to election procedures)
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (sliding-scale approach to preliminary injunction factors)
Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (single analytic framework for voting-rights claims)