Arias v. Marriott International, Inc.
217 F. Supp. 3d 189
D.D.C.2016Background
- Rosa Arias, a Hispanic housekeeper at the Washington Marriott at Metro Center since 2003, alleges Marriott withheld required personal protective equipment (PPE) for hazardous cleaning chemicals and that exposure caused respiratory and eye problems.
- While on medical leave in 2015, Arias testified in a separate lawsuit about chemical exposure and lack of PPE; 44 days later she received a call saying she had been terminated, though that termination was later rescinded and she remained off pay until returning September 20, 2015.
- Arias filed suit asserting multiple claims including Title VII/42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination and retaliation, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination (public policy), aggravated assault, and other claims; she later voluntarily dismissed some counts.
- Marriott moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6); the Court evaluated pleading sufficiency under Twombly/Iqbal standards and the D.C. at-will employment presumption.
- The Court denied dismissal for Arias’s Title VII retaliation claim, her breach of contract claim (finding sufficient allegation of a non–at-will contract), and her breach of implied covenant claim; it dismissed her separate Title VII racial-discrimination claim, common-law wrongful termination claim premised on Title VII, and aggravated-assault claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title VII racial discrimination | Arias alleges discrimination based on race/national origin tied to adverse action (unpaid leave/termination) | Marriott contends pleadings lack facts linking adverse action to race; national-origin theory inadequate | Dismissed: insufficient factual allegations to show race was motivating factor |
| Title VII retaliation | Arias contends her Sanchez deposition is protected activity and temporal proximity plus employer knowledge supports causation for adverse action | Marriott disputes termination occurred or was retaliatory | Denied: retaliation claim survives (protected activity, materially adverse action, causal connection via proximity) |
| Breach of contract | Arias alleges an express/contract employment relationship requiring just-cause termination | Marriott argues presumed at-will employment precludes breach claim | Denied: allegations that termination required just cause suffice to survive pleading stage |
| Breach of implied covenant | Arias claims Marriott’s conduct interfered with contract fruits by denying PPE/terminating her | Marriott argues no enforceable contract alleged | Denied: because contract allegation survives, implied-covenant claim may proceed |
| Wrongful termination (public policy) | In the alternative, Arias alleges common-law wrongful discharge violating public policy (Title VII) | Marriott argues Title VII supplies exclusive remedy so common-law claim barred | Dismissed: wrongful-discharge claim based on Title VII public policy barred (statutory remedy exclusive) |
| Aggravated assault | Arias alleges employer intentionally forced exposure to chemicals constituting assault | Marriott argues criminal statute invoked does not create private civil cause of action and WCA bars tort remedy | Dismissed: no private right under criminal statute; WCA precludes civil assault claim absent narrow intent showing not pled |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (applications of Twombly; pleading must include factual enhancement)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (definition of materially adverse employment action in retaliation context)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (notice-pleading in employment discrimination cases)
- Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127 (elements of prima facie Title VII racial-discrimination claim)
- Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (statutory remedies for employment discrimination are exclusive)
- Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (courts reluctant to infer private right of action from criminal statutes)