Ararso Umare Mumad v. Merrick B. Garland, 11 F.4th 834

Background

Mumad, an Oromo refugee from Ethiopia admitted to the U.S. at age 14, suffered extensive trauma in Ethiopia (parents and siblings killed) and received PTSD diagnoses.
As a juvenile he had an adjudication for sexually assaulting a minor that triggered sex-offender registration duties; as an adult he was later convicted of multiple state crimes (felony theft, failure to register as a predatory offender, and simple robbery) and served prison sentences.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); DHS later sought to terminate withholding based on intervening criminal convictions.
The IJ concluded Mumad committed multiple non-per-se "particularly serious crimes" (PSC) after considering underlying facts showing threatened/actual use of force; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.
Mumad appealed, arguing (1) the non-per-se PSC definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the BIA misapplied the Refugee Convention/non-refoulement obligations by focusing on past conduct instead of present/future dangerousness, and (3) the IJ erred in denying Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief.
The Eighth Circuit denied Mumad’s petition: it held the non-per-se PSC term is not void for vagueness, rejected the treaty-based challenge, and affirmed the CAT denial for lack of requisite proof.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Vagueness of non-per-se PSC (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii))	The statutory phrase is unconstitutionally vague and lets agencies/judges label any conviction a PSC.	The statute contains textual limits ("particularly serious" and "danger to the community") and permits a case-specific, fact-based inquiry.	Not vague: textual modifiers and case-specific analysis supply adequate standards.
Treaty / Refugee Convention (Article 33 non-refoulement)	BIA’s backward-looking PSC focus blocks the Convention’s forward-looking, present-danger inquiry and misreads non-refoulement obligations.	The Convention is not self-executing; domestic law controls; BIA/IJ approach (focus on nature of crime) is permissible and previously upheld.	Treaty claim fails: domestic statute governs PSC; BIA’s approach reasonable and deference applies.
CAT relief standard and denial	Conditions in Ethiopia and Mumad’s history of persecution make torture more likely than not on return.	Record does not meet the "more likely than not" torture standard; State Department evidence weighs against such a finding.	CAT denial affirmed: petitioner conceded record does not meet the required preponderance (>50%) standard.
Need for separate present/future-danger analysis after PSC finding	Mumad: once PSC is found based on past conduct, IJ must still assess present/future dangerousness for withholding.	Once a PSC is found, statute and precedent focus on the nature of the crime and do not require a separate present/future-danger inquiry.	No separate present/future finding required after PSC determination; BIA/IJ approach upheld.

Key Cases Cited

Shazi v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2021) (distinguishes per-se PSCs and recognizes case-by-case non-per-se PSC analysis)
Guerrero v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2018) (upheld non-per-se PSC as not facially vague and endorsed fact-specific inquiry)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (void-for-vagueness analysis of a residual "crime of violence" clause)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (void-for-vagueness holding for an immigration/aggravated-felony residual clause)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual-clause vagueness precedent)
Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009) (describes factors for PSC analysis and focus on nature of the crime)
Silvestre-Giron v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1114 (8th Cir. 2020) (describes CAT "more likely than not" standard and review for substantial evidence)
Purwantono v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2007) (treaty non-self-executing principle applied to Refugee Convention)