84 F.4th 807
9th Cir.2023Background:
- Neighbor Lloyd Wetzel called police Jan. 12, 2018, reporting Remi Sabbe driving erratically on his (the Sabbe family's) rural property, “solid drunk,” possibly with a rifle and that he might have heard a gunshot.
- About 30 officers, two armored vehicles (a marked BEAR and an unmarked Commando V150), and multiple marked cruisers staged around the property; the BEAR got stuck in the mud, leaving only the V150 able to approach.
- The unmarked V150 twice struck Sabbe’s pickup (two PIT maneuvers): first contacting the truck’s rear, spinning it; after the truck stopped and Sabbe began to exit, the V150 struck the passenger-side/cab area, crushing the door against Sabbe’s leg. Moments later officers heard a gunshot and multiple officers fired; Sabbe died with 18 gunshot wounds and an AR-15 was recovered.
- April Sabbe sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for unlawful warrantless entry, excessive force (PIT maneuvers and shooting), and Monell failure-to-train; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants.
- The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed: (1) even if entry was unlawful, it was not the proximate cause of death; (2) a jury could find the second PIT deadly/excessive but officers had qualified immunity because no clearly established law barred armored-vehicle PITs; and (3) the officers’ split-second shooting decision was reasonable for qualified immunity purposes; Monell claim failed for lack of deliberate indifference. Judge Berzon concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing entry was unlawful and proximate, and that qualified immunity should not shield the PIT conduct or the shooting.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrantless entry onto Sabbe property | Entry was a Fourth Amendment violation; that unlawful entry proximately caused Sabbe’s death | Entry was justified by exigent/emergency circumstances or, at minimum, was not the legal cause of death | Even assuming entry violated the Fourth Amendment, it was not the proximate cause of Sabbe’s death (plaintiff also did not pursue nominal damages); summary judgment affirmed on that theory |
| Use of V150 to execute PIT maneuvers (vehicle-to-vehicle force) | Second PIT was deadly/excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment | PIT maneuvers were reasonable under circumstances; alternatively, qualified immunity shields officers because law was not clearly established for armored-vehicle PITs | A jury could find the second PIT constituted deadly/excessive force, but officers are entitled to qualified immunity because existing law did not clearly establish the unlawfulness of using an armored vehicle to perform PITs |
| Officers’ decision to shoot Sabbe | Shooting was excessive because Sabbe had stopped and officers did not meaningfully attempt communication; disputed whether Sabbe actually pointed/fired first | Officers reasonably perceived an immediate threat (reports Sabbe was armed/drunk; officers heard or perceived Sabbe firing/pointing) and reasonably responded with deadly force; qualified immunity applies | On qualified immunity review, officers’ split‑second belief that Sabbe posed an immediate deadly threat was reasonable; summary judgment for defendants affirmed on shooting claim |
| Monell failure-to-train claim against County | County was deliberately indifferent by failing to train or set policy for using armored vehicles like the V150 to execute PITs | County had no demonstrated pattern or obvious need showing deliberate indifference; issue not exempt from Monell standards | Monell claim failed: record does not show the County’s lack of V150-specific guidance rose to deliberate indifference |
Key Cases Cited
- Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021) (exigent-circumstances rule for warrantless entry)
- Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) (proximate-cause requirement in § 1983 actions)
- Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2018) (foreseeability of violent confrontation from unannounced armed entry)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (allowance for split-second police judgments about force)
- Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (definition of deadly force as force creating substantial risk of death or serious injury)
- Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (seizure may occur by use of force such as shooting)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (vehicle ramming in high-speed pursuit can constitute deadly force)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-step and discretion which prong to decide first)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (clearly established law standard for qualified immunity)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability standards under § 1983)