10 F.4th 786
7th Cir.2021Background
- July 2012: surveillance linked Antwon Flint to a Pleasant Prairie liquor‑store robbery; Kenneth Cooper (wounded in a later chase) signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth participant. Flint denied involvement.
- June 16, 2014 (first trial): during defense opening, Flint’s counsel referenced what Flint told police and that he and Cooper were childhood friends; prosecutor objected and moved for a mistrial as the statements were inadmissible hearsay; the trial judge granted the mistrial.
- September 2014 (second trial): a different judge raised double‑jeopardy concerns sua sponte, obtained portions of the first‑trial transcript, concluded the first judge’s mistrial was warranted, and allowed retrial; a jury convicted Flint and he was sentenced.
- Wisconsin Court of Appeals held Flint forfeited a direct double‑jeopardy challenge under Mink for not moving to dismiss at the second trial, reviewed the claim under Strickland (ineffective assistance), and rejected relief as meritless.
- Flint sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief, concluding the state court reasonably applied Arizona v. Washington and AEDPA deference applied; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy/independence of Wisconsin's Mink forfeiture rule (procedural default) | Flint: Mink did not bar federal review because the second judge raised double jeopardy sua sponte, counsel substantially complied, and Lee v. Kemna exception applies. | State: Mink is an adequate and independent state‑law ground; Flint forfeited his double‑jeopardy claim by not moving to dismiss. | Court: No procedural default—Lee exception applies; Mink’s forfeiture rule was not adequately or properly applied to bar federal review. |
| Whether the state court’s disposition was an "adjudication on the merits" that triggers AEDPA deference | Flint: The Wisconsin court resolved the claim only procedurally under ineffective‑assistance review, so AEDPA does not apply. | State: The court reached the intrinsic merits by concluding a double‑jeopardy motion would have failed, so AEDPA applies. | Court: The Wisconsin Court of Appeals evaluated the core double‑jeopardy claim (found it meritless within Strickland); AEDPA deference applies. |
| Whether the mistrial lacked "manifest necessity" and the state court unreasonably applied Arizona v. Washington (double jeopardy) | Flint: Defense remark was tangential and curable by instruction; mistrial was unnecessary and retrial therefore barred. | State: Counsel’s remarks introduced prejudicial hearsay about defendant’s statements and cooperation; trial judges reasonably exercised discretion to declare mistrial under Washington. | Court: Under dual deference (trial‑court deference under Washington and AEDPA to the state court), the Wisconsin court reasonably applied Washington; habeas relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (sets the "manifest necessity" standard for mistrials declared over a defendant's objection and prescribes strong deference to trial judges)
- Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002) (permits federal review despite state procedural bar where a rule is exorbitantly applied in exceptional cases)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (governs ineffective‑assistance analysis: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (2013) (discusses when a state court decision qualifies as an "adjudication on the merits" for AEDPA)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (explains AEDPA's high deference standard for federal habeas relief)
- Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (notes that general rules give courts leeway in case‑by‑case applications under AEDPA)
- Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010) (reinforces AEDPA deference in reviewing state court determinations)