Antonio Buford v. State of Indiana, 139 N.E.3d 1074

In June 2018 Antonio Buford punched E.C. (the mother of his child) during an argument while she held their infant; she had facial bruising and a busted lip. The State charged Buford with multiple felonies including domestic battery and alleged he was an habitual offender.
The trial court issued a no-contact order on July 16, 2018, prohibiting Buford from contacting E.C. in any way.
Prosecutors obtained and presented redacted jail-call recordings (including a January 3, 2019 call) in which Buford spoke with his mother, S.B., and E.C. briefly appeared on the line. The jury convicted Buford of one count of domestic battery as a Level 6 felony and acquitted on other charges.
After the verdict the court held a Rule to Show Cause hearing, found Buford violated the no-contact order, and sentenced him to 90 days in jail for contempt (ordered as a flat, unconditioned sanction). The State filed new criminal counts the same day, including an invasion-of-privacy count alleging the January 3 call violated the no-contact order.
The trial court later sentenced Buford to 2.5 years in community corrections for the domestic-battery conviction. On appeal Buford challenged (1) the contempt finding/sanction and related double-jeopardy concerns and (2) the court’s use of a statutory offense element as an aggravator in sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the contempt sanction was criminal (punitive) and therefore implicated double jeopardy because prosecutors filed criminal invasion-of-privacy charges based on the same conduct	The State does not dispute the contempt was criminal in nature	Buford argued the contempt was criminal and the State’s subsequent prosecution for the same conduct raised double jeopardy concerns; therefore contempt should be vacated	Court found the contempt sanction punitive (criminal), concluded the State’s filing of invasion-of-privacy charges for the same conduct raised double jeopardy concerns, and vacated the contempt finding
Whether the trial court abused sentencing discretion by using as an aggravator a material element of the offense (presence of a child) when enhancing Buford’s sentence above the advisory term	The State argued Buford’s extensive violent criminal history alone justified the sentence enhancement	Buford argued the court improperly used an offense element as an aggravator and offered nothing unique to justify an above-advisory sentence	Court held that even if the child-presence element was improperly considered, other valid aggravators (lengthy violent felony history and violation of the no-contact order) supported the enhanced sentence; sentence affirmed

State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31 (Ind. 1990) (distinguisher on civil vs. criminal contempt and definition of contempt)
In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129 (Ind. 2014) (criminal contempt vindicates court authority and benefits the State)
Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (contumacious sanction that is not purgeable is criminal in nature)
McCollum v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 82 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (incarceration for civil contempt must be coercive and purgeable)
Reed v. Cassady, 27 N.E.3d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (civil contempt coerciveness requirement: opportunity to purge)
Hunter v. State, 802 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (test for whether a noncriminal sanction constitutes jeopardy)
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007) (standard for appellate review of sentencing; permissible and impermissible aggravators)
Hackett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 1999) (a single valid aggravator may support enhancement)
Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846 (Ind. 2014) (nature and circumstances of the crime can be a proper aggravator)