69 F.4th 1332
11th Cir.2023Background
- Wright worked as a Waste Pro driver in Florida from Sept. 2014 to Nov. 2015 and sued for willful FLSA overtime violations.
- FLSA claims accrue on each payday; limitations period is two years (three if willful), so Wright’s last-in-time claim expired Nov. 2018 absent tolling.
- Wright sued Waste Pro entities in D.S.C. (Oct. 2017); Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- D.S.C. dismissed Wright’s claims against those entities without prejudice (July 2019); Wright did not appeal or otherwise preserve the claims there.
- Wright refiled in S.D. Fla. (Aug. 2019); the Florida court found the claims untimely unless tolled, denied equitable tolling, and granted summary judgment for Waste Pro; Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the prior D.S.C. filing (dismissed without prejudice) tolled the FLSA limitations period for the later Florida suit | Wright: the South Carolina filing "commenced" his claim under 29 U.S.C. §256 (and Mickles rationale) so limitations tolled during pendency | Waste Pro: ordinary rule applies—dismissal without prejudice does not toll; statute contains no tolling provision for dismissed suits | Court: No tolling; dismissed suit treated as nullity for limitations; Mickles inapplicable to original plaintiffs |
| Whether opt-in/collective-action principles (Mickles) require tolling for original plaintiffs | Wright: Mickles supports tolling from consent filing to dismissal | Waste Pro: Mickles applied to opt-in plaintiffs, not original plaintiffs | Court: Mickles limited to opt-in plaintiffs; does not extend tolling to original plaintiffs whose complaints were dismissed |
| Whether Section 256 means a filing in a court lacking personal jurisdiction still "commenced" the action for limitations | Wright: §256 distinguishes commencement from jurisdiction; thus his SC filing commenced the claim | Waste Pro: even if commenced, dismissal without prejudice leaves no tolling; statute does not override ordinary rule | Court: Did not need to resolve jurisdictional filing theory; held ordinary dismissal rule controls and no statutory exception applies |
| Whether equitable tolling applies | Wright: equitable tolling warranted because dismissal and jurisdictional issues prevented timely refiling | Waste Pro: Wright lacked diligence and had legal remedies (protective filing, transfer motion, appeal) | Court: Denied equitable tolling—Wright failed to show extraordinary circumstances and did not exercise reasonable diligence; had alternate remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1993) (a suit dismissed without prejudice ordinarily does not toll the statute of limitations)
- Mickles v. Country Club, Inc., 887 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018) (opt-in plaintiffs become parties upon filing consent; tolling applies to dismissed opt-ins)
- Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissal without prejudice treated as though suit were never filed for limitations purposes)
- Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2008) (equitable tolling may be appropriate where plaintiff files protective action while an earlier suit is pending)
- Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (U.S. 1983) (Rule 23 class-action tolling rationale supports tolling unnamed class members while certification pending)
- Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1990) (statutory time limits are presumptively subject to equitable tolling)
- Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 1994) (FLSA cause of action accrues on each payday following the period of underpayment)
- Dade County v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 826 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1987) (voluntary dismissal places the parties as if the suit had never been filed for limitations purposes)
- Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (equitable tolling requires extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiff’s control and diligence)