Anthony Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99

Background

Anthony Hildebrand, a longtime detective, was terminated from the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office on February 18, 2011 after an internal grievance process upheld the termination.
Hildebrand alleged age discrimination and related retaliation, claiming a pattern of pushing out older employees and hostile treatment beginning in 2009.
He completed an EEOC Intake Questionnaire on December 1, 2011 (checking the box requesting the EEOC file a charge) and later submitted a formal Charge of Discrimination on January 11, 2012 naming the DA’s Office; he received a right-to-sue letter and filed suit on August 7, 2012.
Complaint named both Allegheny County and the DA’s Office and asserted ADEA, Title VII (retaliation), § 1983 (Equal Protection and First Amendment), and state-law claims; district court dismissed federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
On appeal the Third Circuit considered: (1) whether § 1983 claims for age discrimination by state/local employees are permissible, (2) whether Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standards apply to pleading exhaustion/conditions precedent under Rule 9(c), and (3) whether the EEOC Intake Questionnaire can constitute a charge of discrimination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a state/local employee may sue for age discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983	Hildebrand: § 1983 may vindicate constitutional equal-protection claims regardless of ADEA	County: ADEA is the exclusive remedy; § 1983 would undermine ADEA’s administrative scheme	ADEA precludes § 1983 age-discrimination claims by state/local employees; § 1983 dismissal affirmed
Whether pleading exhaustion/conditions precedent must meet Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard (Rule 9(c) vs Rule 8(a))	Hildebrand: his complaint adequately alleged EEOC exhaustion; later amended to attach charge	Appellees: original pleadings lacked specificity; district court applied Twombly/Iqbal to dismiss	Rule 9(c) governs conditions precedent and permits a general allegation that administrative exhaustion occurred; Twombly/Iqbal do not apply to Rule 9(c) pleading
Whether the EEOC Intake Questionnaire (revised post-Holowecki) can constitute a timely charge of discrimination	Hildebrand: December 1, 2011 Intake Questionnaire (Box 2 checked) is a charge filed within 300 days of last act	Appellees: only the January 11, 2012 formal charge should count; that charge is untimely if last act is Feb 18, 2011	The completed Intake Questionnaire with Box 2 checked constitutes a charge under Holowecki and EEOC revisions; Hildebrand’s Intake was timely as to the DA’s Office
Whether the ADEA claim can proceed against Allegheny County	Hildebrand: County generally named in complaint; intake/charge implicated employer(s)	County: not named on Intake Questionnaire; not identified as respondent until after deadline	ADEA claim against County is dismissed: the Intake Questionnaire named only the DA’s Office, so Hildebrand failed to timely exhaust as to the County

Key Cases Cited

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for Rule 8(a) claims)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (clarifies Twombly plausibility framework)
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (permissive view of what constitutes an EEOC charge)
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (analysis of when statutory remedial schemes preclude § 1983)
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364 (leading circuit precedent holding ADEA precludes § 1983 age claims)
Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (Seventh Circuit decision concluding ADEA does not preclude § 1983; contrasted by this panel)
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (statute’s comprehensive remedial scheme can preclude § 1983)
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (statutory scheme may displace § 1983 where Congress intended)
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (statutory remedial scheme precluding § 1983 enforcement)