*2 crimination and he is entitled to relief MURNAGHAN, Before CHAPMAN (1982). under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 §§ WILKINSON, Judges. Circuit upon 1985 action an conspiracy between Police Commission- CHAPMAN, Judge: Circuit er City Robinson and “Baltimore Police This is Department.” discrimination action Zombro also claims that brought under U.S.C. Department and 1985 Police and the Commissioner §§ (ADEA), seq. et equal protection under Act U.S.C. right to
violated his effectuating Zombro, however, Plaintiff declined to Amendment the Fourteenth bring the ADEA.1 Rath- his transfer. this action under er, employer’s alleges he that his action opinion dated October In memorandum violation granted defen- district court guarantee or clause of Fourteenth the. summary stat- judgment, dants’ motion *3 Amendment, and that this federal constitu- a Four- ing failed to assert that Zombro deprivation is a of tional violation sufficient liberty in- property or teenth Amendment rights give rise 1983 action. to a § action required to maintain an as terest Particularly, the 1983 and 1985. under §§ provides comprehen The ADEA a property had no court stated Zombro statutory prohibit discrimi sive scheme specific post duty of or work in a interest age. in employment nation on the basis of Department. in the location plan to facilitate and The was structured age discrimination is claims that Zombro encourage compliance through an informal for action under proper a basis § process Rog of conciliation mediation. and sup- facts to that he sufficient and Co., Engineering ers Exxon Research & is of action. There a port a cause such 834, (3rd Cir.1977), 550 F.2d cert. de dispute to the reason his factual 749, 1022, nied, L.Ed. 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. transfer, he that he need not and asserts (1978). prerequisite bring A 2d 770 the un- liberty property interest establish a or ing a is that private of action the Four- protection clause the der of the Employment Opportunity Commission or under 1983 or teenth Amendment §§ (EEOC) given sixty days notice. must be 1985. 626(d). period designed 29 U.S.C. This § give the the EEOC time mediate II. grievance methods “by informal of concilia A. tion, conference, and persuasion.” 29 U.S. provides perti- Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 § 626(b). right pri The C. to commence a § part: nent noted, action, vate it should be terminates who, any Every person under color of upon filing by of an EEOC. the action the custom, ordinance, statute, regulation, or 626(c). Finally, notification to 29 U.S.C. § subjects any of usage ... ... citizen the days given must be within 180 the EEOC deprivation to the United States ... alleged unlawful actions took after the any rights, privileges, or se- immunities seeking place, party is also state unless laws, by the Constitution and shall cured 626(d)(1). relief. U.S.C. § party injured.... to the be liable If a of substantive under violation any not in itself create Section does by way of a the ADEA could be asserted Rather, rights. substantive action, aggrieved party could basis receive specific provisions of law. avoid these deprivation by the Con right of a “secured plaintiff The would have direct and immedi- stitution and laws” of the United States courts, the com- ate access to federal person acting color under of state law. prehensive process be administrative would Chapman Rights Or v. Houston Welfare bypassed, goal compliance 1905, ganization, 441 U.S. through mediation would be discarded. (1979). L.Ed.2d purposes The and structure of the claims, course, are with the notion that the Plaintiffs fall inconsistent The compre- supplanted by scope specific remedies it affords could be within the of the judicial inescapable relief. The provided remedies alternative hensive administrative foregoing Employment conclusion to be from the Age Discrimination drawn 49B, 1, etseq. similarly tion Md.Ann.Code art. Plaintiff declined to seek relief statutes. The Maryland's State under the anti-discrimina- if 42 is that U.S.C. 1983 is available to U.S. 101 S.Ct. litigant, congressional
the ADEA quoting Maine v. Thi boutot, scheme behind ADEA enforcement could 22 n.
easily
undermined,
destroyed.2
if
(1980)
2514 n.
(Powell,
withstand a more Clammers, supra, proscribe private statutory remedy designed hensive to re action Supreme under 1983. The actions, Court specific dress § unlawful such as held that a 1983 Zombro, action was alleged by those barred be- § unless the statute cause had created a detailed stat- question congressional manifests a in utory enforcement scheme under the Water tent to allow an pur individual a choice of Act, 1251, Pollution Control et 33 U.S.C. suing independently rights § under both the seq., Protection, Research, and the Marine statutory scheme applica and some other Act, 1401, and Sanctuaries et 33 U.S.C. § ble federal statute. County Middlesex In seq. The framework available under the Sewerage Authority v. National Sea specific comprehen- is no less Clammers, 1, 2615, 453 U.S. 101 S.Ct. sive. Supreme the Court in structed alleged that “when is [the state] judice, sub controversy however, In the have violated a pro federal statute which City Department Baltimore Police comprehensive vides its own alleged purposes to have violated for scheme, requirements of that enforce equal protec- 1983not the but the § procedure may bypassed ment not tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. bringing 1983.” Id. directly suit under § The bring Plaintiffs decision to this em- 20, 2626, quoting Chapman at S.Ct. at ployment discrimination case under Rights v. Houston Organization, pass- Fourteenth Amendment without even Welfare 600, 2, 1905, 1945 673 n. n. ing reference to the ADEA makes this an (1979) (Stewart, J., dis unusual case. senting). Hornbeck, H.R. v. Supreme The suggested (D.Md.1981), Court has that a the court turned down a foreclosed, gov- 1983 action is predicated “where the
§
action
on a claim under
§
erning
statute
an exclusive reme-
clause of the Four
dy for violation of its terms.” Pennhurst
teenth
presented
Amendment which was
Halderman,
State
Hospital
School and
with other actions on the same matter
adopt
argument,
If
litigant
we
Plaintiffs
protects rights
§
because the section
may bypass any remedy Congress may provide
privileges
“secured
the Constitution and
directly
and come
into federal court under
laws" of the United States.
Act),
(Re-
capped
29 U.S.C.
Rehabilitation Act of
Children
brought under the
Act)
of All
1983 while
the Education
habilitation
U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
proceeding
Act of
Handicapped Children
a state
administrative
was
Rights
pending.
Civil
Act of
District
dismissed
and the
The
Court
U.S.C. §
VII).
(based
stating
page
on Title
42 U.S.C.
action and we affirmed
239:
Novotny,
all
Relying
rejected
the court
recognized
correctly
The
court
district
claims,
including the Fourteenth
premature
federal action
claim,
plaintiffs
Amendment
because
Scruggs
not
had
exhausted
comprehensive admin
to exhaust the
failed
their
remedies
ei-
administrative
procedures provided
the various
istrative
Handicapped
All
ther the Education for
as
handicap
statutes.
“To
Act or the
Children
Rehabilitation Act.
selfsame
as a constitutional
sert
Myers
[Shipbuilding]
v. Bethlehem
Congress has endeavored
41, 50-52,
Corp., statutory
through specific
schemes
protect
L.Ed.
pro
the remedies
prohibited]
... until
[is
Scruggs’ allegation that their administra-
process
by the
have
administrative
vided
tive remedies were futile is refuted
Hornbeck, supra at 222.
exhausted.”
been
final
decision
their
administrative
Moreover,
Scruggs’
favor.
citation
similarly
has
demon
42 U.S.C.
which does
re-
to entertain
a disinclination
strated
quire
exhaustion
reme-
administrative
bypassed a
in which
have
actions
dies,
prevail
entitle
did not
them
in favor
their race to the courthouse.
predicated
1983 claim
of a §
*5
Preiser v. Rod
In
violation.
constitutional
Tyson,
v.
F.Supp.
See also Turillo
535
577
475,
1827,
411
93 S.Ct.
36
riguez,
U.S.
(D.R.I.1982)
(Education
All
for
Handi-
(1973),
439
the court turned down
L.Ed.2d
capped Children Act’s remedial devices
attempts
disregard
specif
prisoners’
the
sufficiently comprehensive
found
to infer
remedy
corpus
of
in
ic
the habeas
statute
congressional
intent
1983
withdraw §
alleging
1983
of an action under
favor
§
remedy).
rights.
of
In
constitutional
violations
prudential policy
evince
These cases
Robinson,
992,
v.
Smith
Congress
provided a
that where
has
com-
(1984),
82 L.Ed.2d
the
sim
746
court
framework,
prehensive remedial
such as
of
ilarly held that the Education
the Handi
ADEA, plaintiff
the
relieved of the
is not
Act,
seq.,
et
20
capped
U.S.C. §
obligation
proce-
remedial
to follow that
remedy
spelled out the
for the
exclusive
claiming
by
dure
that
action
state
violative
notwithstanding the
plaintiffs,
fact
statutory
of
violates
the
scheme also
the
had
raised.
constitutional claims
been
(or
Amendment
some other con-
Fourteenth
In Brown v.
right). A
General Services Adminis
stitutional
mere assertion that
tration,
rights
425
48
constitutional
have been somehow
ipso
action,
infringed
1981
the
does not
defeat
the
L.Ed.2d
a §
facto
coverage, application
exclusivity
of
of
Court held that
the Civil
and
§
comprehensive
specifical-
Rights
statutory
Act of
as added
11 of the
scheme
§
Congress
Employment Opportunity
ly
of
redress the
Act
enacted
al-
(1970 ed.,
leged
rights.
Supp.
of
U.S.C.
2000e-16
violation
§
IV),
challeng
for
remedy
exclusive
is not
This Court
unaware
case
employ
in
ing racial discrimination
federal
distinguished
many
at bar can be
though
ment even
such
cited above insofar as the
cases
§
the Constitution.” Id.
“clearly violated
...
predicated
alleged
judice
sub
claim
on an
824-25, 96
at 1963-64.
at
only
does
constitutional violation
Scruggs
Campbell,
part
rest
or whole on
F.2d 237
viola-
Cir.1980),
(4th
handicapped
rights
of a
tions
substantive
under
parents
brought
comprehensive
action
20 ADEA or some other
statu-
child
a federal
Nevertheless,
1415(e)(2)(Education
tory
general
of All
U.S.C.
Handi-
scheme.
suits,
Marston,
(N.D.
policy
precluding
F.Supp.
where
Ill.1978)
(“Congress
has enacted a
intended the ADEA to
specifically designed to
statute
redress
remedy
be the exclusive
for
discrimina
alleged by
plaintiff,
grievances
is as
employment.”)
tion
federal
applicable in
such as the
instances
case
The text and context of the ADEA itself
constitutional claim is
bar as cases where a
provisions
confirm this conclusion: “The
statutory
brought
attached to a
un-
chapter
this
shall be enforced in accordance
policy
der
1983. We hold that
this
powers, remedies,
procedures
with
should be followed unless the
provided
211(b),
(except
sections
for
comprehensive statutory
history of the
(a) thereof)_”
subsection
29 U.S.C.
question
congres-
scheme
manifests a
626(b).
part
Section 216 is a
of the Fair
pur-
an individual to
sional intent
allow
(FLSA),
Labor Standards Act
29 U.S.C.
independently rights
sue
under both the
seq.,
et
and it has
held
been
§§
comprehensive statutory scheme and other
statutory remedy
of that section is the
statutes,
applicable state and federal
such
remedy
sole
employee
available to the
as 42
1983. We find no such
U.S.C. §
may
of whatever
he
language
history
intent in the
under the
Inflight
have
FLSA. Lerwill v.
Pictures,
Inc.,
Motion
F.Supp.
An examination of the Act reveals that it
(N.D.Calif.1972).
precisely drawn,
statute,
is a
detailed
sim-
provisions
of the
we thus
ilar to other
schemes which have
conclude,
congressional
evidence
intent
provide
judicial
held to
the exclusive
been
foreclose actions for
discrimination un-
stated abuse. The conclusion
der
1983. To allow such actions would
is irresistible that the ADEA
only
congressional
circumvent the obvious
judicial remedy
for claims of
exclusive
mandate,
procedures
as the
well
detailed
Burroughs Corp.,
discrimination. Platt v.
implausible
Act. It is
(E.D.Pa.1976).
A
preserve
pri-
would have intended to
similarly
of federal courts
number
have
vate cause of action under
1983 for
opined
that substantive
secured
that cause
when
of action
the ADEA
not be used as the basis for
*6
undermine,
debilitate,
if
severely
would
See, e.g.,
a
1983 suit.
Paterson v. Wein-
by
the enforcement mechanism created
521,
(5th Cir.1981)
644
berger,
F.2d
Congress,
under the ADEA.
we
(following the
extension of the
to
believe,
permit plaintiffs
did not intend to
employees,
federal
the ADEA
ex-
became
bypass
comprehensive statutory
the
remedy
clusive
discrimination in
clearly
language
scheme
embodied in the
employment); Ring Crisp
federal
v.
Coun-
legislative history
merely
and
of the ADEA
477,
ty Hospital
F.Supp.
Authority,
they
employed by
agency
are
an
(M.D.Ga.1987)(“ADEA
is the exclusive
operating under color of state law.
discrimination,
for claims of
congressional
In addition to
intent evi-
those claims are
whether
founded
the
dent in the ADEA to foreclose
discrimi-
or on
Constitution
created
the
1983,
nation suits under
we also conclude
underlying
It is the
conduct and
counselling
that additional factors exist
not the
asserted that determine the
recognizing
hesitation before
a 1983 rem-
remedy.”);
Bailey,
McCroan
edy
in an
1201,
case. The
(S.D.Ga.1982)
F.Supp.
(rights
1209-10
Maryland
City
laws of the State
and the
created
ADEA cannot be enforced
Baltimore,
1983);
as
as
through
well
well-established
Morgan v. Humboldt
public policy, recognize
District,
440,
government
County School
(D.Nev.1985)(§
employers, especially police departments,
preempted
1983 action
must
ADEA where
have wide discretion and control over
fails
management of
the
their
allege
showing
personnel
facts
a violation of some
and inter-
federally
right
operations.
particularly
secured
other than those
nal
This is
true in
ADEA);
already protected by
police department,
paramilitary depart-
the
Christie
right
encompass every conceiv-
public
of action to
ment,
discipline and
internal
where
police
grievance
workplace.
commissioner
in the
safety require that
able
authority
precise statutory
discretion
afforded broad
and enacted a
conceived
the
reassign members of
assign and
ADEA,
remedy,
redress the unlaw-
the
In a case
posts.3
department to various
alleged by
If
acts
the Plaintiff.
we
ful
probationary
of a
involving the dismissal
bypass the
as the Plaintiff
were
empha
servant,
Supreme Court
the
civil
do,
transfer wholesale
seeks to
we would
rule that
the “well-established
sized
relations into the feder-
public employment
traditionally
granted
has
been
Government
any
specific
courts without
concrete
al
‘dispatch
of its
the widest latitude
priori-
expression of federal constitutional
” Sampson v. Mur
internal affairs.’
own
ty-
937, 949,
61, 83,
94 S.Ct.
ray, 415 U.S.
governmental em
L.Ed.2d
claim,
The source of Zombro’s
as
relationship
signifi
was a
ployer-employee
suits,
many
is
as
other discrimination
well
Kennedy, 416 U.S.
factor Arnett v.
cant
of the Four
clause
1644,
40 L.Ed.2d
noteworthy
Amendment. It is
teenth
employee
(1974),
held a civil service
explicitly
Supreme Court has stated
pre-termi-
right to a
process
no
had
due
equal protection clause does not
that the
Powell,
hearing.
evidentiary
Justice
nation
aged”
recognize
defined as the
a “class
emphatically stated
concurring opinion,
in a
special protec
suspect class in need of
be a
“Government,
employer,
tion in which
sub
control over
must
wide discretion
have
judicial scrutiny." Massa
ject to “strict
and inter
management
personnel
of its
Murgia,
Board
Retirement v.
chusetts
168, 94
at 1651.
at
S.Ct.
nal affairs.” Id.
307, 313-14,
2566-
conclude,
light of
in the
We therefore
(1976).4
Citing
Unit
ADEA reme
existence
Co., 304
v. Carolene Products
ed States
relationship in
dies,
employer-employee
783-
152-153 n.
U.S.
discipline, mo
involving police
this case—
Murgia
n.
intervene
motion of un- We find Zombro’s as asserted personnel, where the asserted ademic Amendment, der the Fourteenth based tainted action taken was claim is transfer, upon alleged discriminatory is not or was or sex discrimination justiciable. racial There is no claim denial equal protection upon race or sex or exercise of penalize intended upon the discrimination based exercise But, rights. First Amendment absent protected rights. First Amendment Admit- discrimi- impermissible sex or racial such may “positive tedly, the ADEA constitute or First Amendment restraints— nations express statutory mandate” under Clark. express positive consti- clear violations however, complaint, has In his Zombro tutional or “[t]he mandate — made no claim under the appropriate not the fo- federal court is rum in to review the multitude B. daily made personnel decisions that are Zombro’s claim under U.S.C. accept by public agencies. We must alleges that the Police Commission mis- harsh fact that numerous individual police department to conspired with the er day-to-day in the ad- takes are inevitable of his deny him affairs. The United ministration of our 1985(3)requires conspiracy age. Section feasibly cannot States Constitution not persons.” or more Zombro has “of two require judicial re- construed to federal Depart conspiracy. such every such error. the ab- view The Police person. ment is not a Commis public em- any sence of claim that the Department cannot be sioner as head by a desire to cur- ployer was motivated conspiracy into with held to have entered penalize of an tail or to the exercise Kirven, 775 Department. Buschi v. constitutionally protected employee’s (4th Cir.1985). A de F.2d 1251-53 rights, presume must that official we itself. conspire with partment and, erroneous, regular if can action was 1985 must be The claim under U.S.C. § ways. corrected in other best be allege facts it does not dismissed because *8 of Fourteenth granted. Due Process Clause the Fed.R. upon relief can be 12(b)(6). guarantee against Amendment is not a Civ.P. brought by public employ- sector
phasizes ADEA, parallels VII between Title and the comparable of con- ees. We find no evidence Keller is unlike the case at bar in that the support equal protec- history gressional § intent to 1983 of Title VII reveals that Con- age challenges of gress comprehensive tion in the area did not intend the statu- comprehensive remedial tory operate with the scheme of VII to to the exclu- concurrent Title of framework of the sion of Fourteenth Amendment claims racial 1372 82 herein, judg- reasons stated
For the majority argues compre- The ADEA’s court is that the district ment of enforcement mechanism demon- hensive AFFIRMED. Congress’ preempt strates intent to use of equal protection 1983 to redress viola- § MURNAGHAN, Judge, Circuit arising tions discrimination in dissenting part concurring in reasoning public employment. That part: the crucial distinc- flawed because blurs majority that Zombro agree I with types very tions two different between legally sufficient claim to state has failed 1983 claims discrimination cases. § However, the ma- 42 U.S.C. § a comprehensive The existence of reme congressional intent in thwarted jority has preclude dial in the ADEA scheme would Age Discrimination declaring that basing only suit if his Zombro’s he were (“ADEA”)1 precludes Act Employment rights 1983 action on the cre substantive § 1983 use of 42 U.S.C. to assert § Zombro’s ADEA by ated itself. See Middlesex alleged age for protection claim County Sewerage Authority v. National 1983 Zombro’s claim re- discrimination. § Ass’n, 1, 20, Sea Clammers U.S. grant I reverse the would mains viable. 2615, 2626, (1981) S.Ct. L.Ed.2d judgment on the claim summary § (§ remedy plain foreclosed because proceed- further the case for and remand on rights tiffs created under ings. statutes, two of which federal both con comprehensive “quite tained enforcement I. mechanisms”). however, Zombro, bases overstepped majority has its bounds The rights his 1983 action created § substituting judgment for its Protection Clause of Fourteenth Congress question on the whether enact- Amendment, not ADEA. When Con repealed ADEA 1983 reme- ment of the § gress creating enacts a law substantive alleged equal protection violations dies prescribes in that statute de govern- arising out of discrimination in comprehensive tailed and enforcement Congress, employment. It is for ment scheme, presume, it is reasonable to absent Court, to repeal to decide whether this specific contrary, to the that Con evidence statutory remedies created gress intended mechanism be the redress for seek constitutional violations. remedying method for exclusive violations however, ignored has its majority, id.; created that statute. See role and assumed for itself the proper has Bailey, McCroan v. nullify remedies power previous- § (S.D.Ga.1982) (rights created by 1209-10 government employees. ly available ADEA not be enforced in 1983 ac any majority has acted without evidence tion); Wayne Day County v. Board of Congress intended ADEA whatsoever (6th Auditors, 749 F.2d Cir. to foreclose claims under 1984) (§ 1983 cannot used to enforce despite 1983 and several indications VII, Title has its because Title VII own preserve lawmakers fact wished mechanism). See also Great remedy for constitutional claims Savings Federal Loan American & Ass’n age discrimination cases. 366, 378, Novotny, (1979) (vio 2345, 2351-52, L.Ed.2d A. Title VII cannot be asserted in lation of action). However, 1985(3) mere decide the enactment of the ex To whether ADEA’s foreclosed Zombro’s discrimina- istence of statu tory nothing tion claim under we must tells us about whether focus repeal intended to or to what intended. See retain Smith Robinson, 1983 cause of action for enforcement of 104 S.Ct. § seq. 1. 29 U.S.C. 621 et *9 prior
rights
indepen-
statutory
that existed
to and
volved
schemes specifically de-
signed
Congress
dently
provide
of the ADEA.
methods for
enforcing
rights
constitutional
violations.
majority adopts
presumption
a
The
that
Rodriguez,
Preiser v.
411 U.S.
congressional enactment of a statute con-
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 439
the Court
taining
comprehensive
a
enforcement
held
prisoners
that state
could not assert
repeal
result in
mechanism will
of all exist-
their
through
constitutional claims
§
ing
remedies for violations of
Congress
had enacted the federal
to,
of,
yet independent
are similar
those
corpus statute,
2254,2
habeas
28 U.S.C. §
presump-
created
the statute. Such a
provided
specific
a more
mechanism
Supreme
tion runs counter to the
Court’s
prisoners
challenge
custody
their
on
strong policy against repeals
legislation
of
grounds.
489-90,
constitutional
Id. at
by implication. “In the
of some
absence
S.Ct. at 1835-1837. In another decision on
showing
affirmative
of an
intention
re-
majority relies,
which the
Supreme
the
peal,
only permissible justification
the
for a
Court held that the Education of the Handi-
repeal by implication is when the earlier
capped
(“EHA”)3 precluded
Act
plain-
the
and later
statutes
are irreconcilable.”
using
tiff from
to “assert an
§
Mancari,
535, 550,
Morton v.
protection claim to a publicly
spe-
financed
2474, 2482,
L.Ed.2d 290
cial
Robinson,
education.” Smith v.
Here,
equal protec-
the
and a 1983
3466-3467,
hardly
They
tion claim are
irreconcilable.
(1984)
(holding superseded
merely represent complementary methods
1415(f)).4
by 20
language
U.S.C.
The
of
fighting age
of
discrimination. We must
the EHA
history
and its
con-
presume,
specific
unless there is
evidence
Congress
vinced
Court that
intended
contrary,
intended to
provide,
alia,
statute to
inter
a detailed
government
allow state and local
employ-
handicapped
mechanism for
children to as-
challenge alleged age
ees to
sert
their constitutional claims.
Id. at
equal protection
on
grounds under §
1009-10, 1016,
tended
enforcing
challenged mandatory
retire-
of
sub-
had
ployees
a method
cases as
tion
arising
grounds,
from sources other
equal protection
on
as
ment rules
stantive
ADEA,
ADEA.6
and had succeed-
than the
as under the
well
having
in
the rules
on rare occasions
ed
B.
See
House Se-
declared unconstitutional.
Aging, Mandatory
Re-
can,
on
against preemption
lect Committee
presumption
Human Cost
The Social and
tirement:
by specific evidence
course,
be rebutted
of
of
Idleness,
Cong.,
of
1st Sess.
to foreclose use
95th
Congress intended
that
Enforced
protection
15-17,
Ag-
for
on
bring equal
claims
“Committee
38
1983 to
[hereinafter
ing Report”], reprinted
in
EEOC,
in
Legisla-
the work-
age
discrimination
However,
lan-
neither
in
place.
History
Age
Discrimination
tive
of
body
leg-
extensive
of
(1981)
nor the
guage itself
Employment Act
347
[herein-
any intent
Con-
history evinces
Cong.
islative
“Legislative History”];8
123
after
dis-
remedies
reprinted in
gress
to eliminate
34,306-07 (1977),
Legis-
Rec.
the enact-
prior
existed
that
crimination
(“A
court
History,
493-94
Federal
lative
at
fact,
legislative
In
ment of the ADEA.
equal-protection guaran-
recently
held
that
opposite.
precisely the
history suggests
preclude
singling
out of certain
tees
early
most
employees for
retirement when
enacting
1978
course of
al-
in similar circumstances were
others
statute,7 Congress dem-
to the
amendments
continue”)
(excerpt
newspa-
lowed to
understanding that the ADEA
onstrated its
into
per column inserted
Senator Church
plain-
age discrimination
preclude
did not
debate). Despite
during floor
know-
protection
record
equal
bringing federal
tiffs from
government
employees,
Congress
ing that
some
Specifically, members
claims.
Administration,
Aging Report recognized
Committee on
8.The
Services
6. Brown v. General
1961,
challenge age
820,
would continue to
48 L.Ed.2d
inapposite
governmental employment
by majority, is
on
discrimination in
another case cited
equal protection grounds:
because Zombro
be decided here
to the issue to
employee.
held that
Brown
is not a federal
the committee
A number of witnesses before
Rights
provided
Act of 1964
Civil
mandatory
retirement based
contended
challenging racial dis-
the exclusive means
solely
unconstitutional because
on
is
employment.
U.S. at
crimination in federal
process"
"equal protec-
violates the “due
However,
835,
have
as we
S.Ct. at 1969.
and 14th Amendments
tion” clauses of
5th
before,
holding
emphasized
was
Brown's
Proponents
posi-
of this
the Constitution.
showing
legislative history
be-
encouraged by two almost simulta-
tion were
lieved,
prior
mistakenly,
extension
albeit
in
which were seen as
neous decisions
workers,
government
"federal
VII
Title
position.
to their
favorable
judicial
intention-
employees
had no
15, reprinted
Aging Report,
at
Committee
employment
Keller
discrimination.”
al acts of
History,
Among
Legislative
the court
at 324.
(4th
George's County, 827 F.2d
v. Prince
Report
Bradley
decisions discussed in the
Brown,
Cir.1987), citing
425 U.S. at
Vance,
(D.D.C.1977),
which had
However, "Congress
aware of
at 1965-66.
mandatory retirement
rules on
struck down
employees
such
the remedies for state
Following
grounds.
passage
equal protection
Keller,
preexisted
827 F.2d
Title VII."
to the
the Su-
amendments
Thus,
added).
in Keller
(emphasis
we held
Bradley, holding
preme
that the
Court reversed
employees
government
that state and local
complied
mandatory
with the
retirement rules
claims under
could assert race
protection require-
equal
Fifth Amendment’s
holding
notwithstanding
of Brown.
ments. 440 U.S.
below, Congress’ intent
As discussed in the text
respect
for state and
to Title VII remedies
with
pro-
discussion of
For further
significant
government
local
workers
challenges
tection
provisions
interpreting
of the
aid in
the similar
Rosenblum,
government employment, see M.
Age
Combating
Steps
Discrimination
The Next
Special
to Man-
Employment: With
protected
raised
7. The 1978 amendments
Reference
Working
Policy,
Paper
datory
mandatory
Retirement
age category
prohibited
70 and
Aging,
Cong.,
Special Committee on
95th
S.Rep.
Senate
employees. See
retirement of certain
1977),
(Comm.
reprinted
Print
reprinted
1st Sess. 8-11
Cong.,
in 1978
2d Sess.
No.
95th
History,
Legislative
at 288-91.
Cong. & Ad.News 504.
U.S.Code
protected
e.g., Day,
whom the
had
since
749 F.2d at
the Fourth
framing
were
their
discrimination ac-
VII,
Circuit has concluded that Title
even
claims,
tions as
though
it has a
*11
expressed
disapproval
practice
no
of the
or mechanism,
preclude
public
does
sec
suggested
any way
in
it
intended
bringing
employee
tor
a 1983 action
§
ADEA to foreclose such constitutional chal-
violations of the Four
fact,
lenges.
report
one committee
indi-
teenth Amendment’s
Protection
Congress
cates that some members of
ex-
George’s
Clause. Keller v. Prince
Coun
pected
challenges
such constitutional
to
952, 953,
(4th
ty,
Cir.1987)
827 F.2d
958-63
future, although they
continue in the
real-
(plaintiff sought
redress
racial discrimi
light
ized
in
the chance
success was slim
VII).
nation under both
1983 and Title
§
Supreme
per
opinion
of the
Court’s
curiam
legislative history
The
of Title
VII’s
in Massachusetts Board
Retirement v.
amendments, which
coverage
extended
to
307,
2562,
Murgia, 427 U.S.
49 government employees, made clear Con
upheld
L.Ed.2d 520
manda- gress’ intent that Title VII not foreclose
tory
against
equal pro-
retirement law
equal protection claims under
1983 based
challenge.
Ag-
tection
Committee on
See
racial,
types
sexual or other
of discrimi
ing Report,
38, reprinted
Legislative
at
in
by
nation covered
the statute.
Id. at 958-
History, at 347.9
62.
Congress
Had
wished to foreclose access
legislative history
of the 1972 Title
fight age
to remedies other than ADEA to
particularly helpful
VII amendments is
in
discrimination,
certainly
it
could have done
deciphering congressional intent in amend
amendments,
in
so
the 1978
or at least
ing ADEA
coverage
in 1974 to extend
expressed
could have
desire to do so in
its
government
Kelly,
workers.
801 F.2d at
the various floor debates and committee
sponsored
271. Senator Bentsen first
reports.
Congress
But
did
I
not.
must
amendment to the ADEA in 1972 at the
Congress’
infer from
inaction that it intend-
considering
same time
exten
ed that
discrimination
would
government employees.
sion of Title VII to
continue to have
1983 available to seek
Id.;
Elrod,
(7th
EEOC v.
674 F.2d
alleged equal protection
redress for
viola-
Cir.1982).
time,
At that
Senator Bentsen
tions.
on the floor of the
“I
stated
Senate:
be
Rights
Title VII of the Civil
Act of
principles underlying
lieve that the
these
1964,10the statute on which the ADEA was
provisions
[extending
in the EEOC bill
Title
closely patterned,
also
useful in
protection
government
VII
are
workers]
sight
into whether
intended
Age
directly applicable to the
Discrimina
ADEA to foreclose all
1983 actions for
Employment
Cong.Rec.
tion in
Act.”
Mayer
discrimination. See Oscar
&
15,895 (1972),reprinted
Legislative
in
His
Evans,
750, 755-56,
Co. v.
S.Ct.
tory,
at 208. The
and other
(1979) (rely
Contrary to the
F.2d at
see
tions,
for
preserving
it seems reasonable that
intended
the §
risk
equal protection
discrimi-
tolerate the much smaller
violations
might
“severely
forego the
nation
undermine”
cases will not
ADEA remedies in favor of constitutional
nor
ADEA’s enforcement
“debilitate” the
I
fact,
challenge
1983.
conclude that
any
effect that
mechanism.
law,
See,
altogeth-
University
as a matter
e.g., Mississippi
eliminate his claim
11.
Women
for
718, 724,
Hogan,
U.S.
S.Ct.
3335-
er.
Boren,
(1982); Craig
tion in the to retain the bringing equal protection claim under II. 1983, as well as a claim under the ADEA. majority merely is not content precludes hold that the ADEA
C.
Zombro’s
Unfortunately,
1983 claim.
majority
I
pre
The result
reach is consistent with
compounds
by adding
its mistake
to its
decisions of the
vious
Court and
opinion
grossly
dictum that
misstates
Although
this
neither
Circuit.14
court has
protection
The majority opinion ap-
law.
directly addressed the issue of whether the
pears to assert that
if
even Zombro’s suit
ADEA forecloses an action for an
preempted by
were
his
violation,
equal protection
have as
both
Fourteenth Amendment claim under
sumed that such a
re
constitutional claim
justiciable
would not be
because he has not
Bradley,
mains available.
See
alleged discrimination based on race or sex
(analyz
95 n.
at 940-41
n.
protected
or exercise of
First Amendment
ing plaintiff’s
claim under
*13
rights.
majority’s strange
Under the
view
component
Amendment,
of Fifth
even
law, government
of the
employees appar-
though plaintiff
previously
had
asserted a
ently
equal protection
could never raise
claim,
facts,
based on same
under the
challenges
age
discrimination in the
ADEA);
Mayor City
v.
Johnson
&
Coun
workplace, even if the ADEA did not exist.
Baltimore,
(4th
cil
731 F.2d
210-11
Although that view is mere dictum and
Cir.1984) (in
alleging age
suit
discrimina
value,
precedential
thus has no
I feel com-
tion,
equal protec
court considered both an
pelled
respond
I
majori-
because fear the
tion claim under
1983 and a claim based
ty’s unnecessary
misleading
and
comments
ADEA),
grounds,
on the
rev’d on other
produce
could
confusion which
come
will
353, 105
472 U.S.
S.Ct.
to haunt us in
back
future cases.
(1985);
Grisell,
Arritt v.
567 F.2d
(4th
(same).
Cir.1977)
also,
1269-72
See
majority’s position
The
flies in the face
Lubbock,
v.
664 F.2d
1266-71
Alford
Supreme
of several decisions of the
(5th
1982) (same),
denied,
Cir. Unit A
cert.
earlier,
I
and our own Circuit. As
noted
975, 102
456 U.S.
S.Ct.
Supreme
Court at least twice has al-
(1982). The
in
courts
those cases ex
litigants
challenge age
lowed
discrimina-
pressed
propriety
no concern
about
equal protection grounds.
on
tion
See
bringing
in
1983 action
discrimi
(chal-
Bradley, 440 U.S.
mandatory retirement
(same).
foreign
the conduct of our
relations in the
F.2d 1267
world,”
post-war
to raise an
discrimina
Whiting,
Our decision
Clark
equal protection
tion
under the
com
claim
Cir.1979),
(4th
support
no
F.2d 684
ponent
Fifth
Pro
Amendment’s Due
majority’s position
Fourteenth
for the
Bradley,
cess Clause.
440 U.S. at
non-justiciable if
claims are
Amendment
plaintiffs
at
944.16 The
alleged age
occupied positions
both
at least as
cases
employment.
majority
government
and sensitive
that of a Balti
hazardous
ignores
fact
conveniently
that Clark
officer,
City police
yet
more
the Su
recognized
courts
enter-
expressly
will
preme
equal
Court did
consider their
equal protection claims from
some
tain
non-justiciable.
protection claims
though
employees even
neither race
public
course,
dangerous
alleged.
make
Of
discrimination is
To
sensitive
nor sex
clear,
following
nature of
make it
point
inserted
law
we
course, if
rule
Zombro to
on the mer-
“Of
difficult for
succeed
footnote Clark:
against
equal protection
plain-
its of
discriminated
out-of-sta-
his
claim.
on its face
non-graduates,
justiciable
Murgia
Bradley
tiffs in both
ultimate-
ters or
ly
challenges,
might
presented.”
failed in their constitutional
protection
merely
part
special
n. 13.
used
at
because the
nature
F.2d at 641
Clark
least
Foreign
of law enforcement and the
Ser-
and racial discrimination as exam-
sexual
“positive
particularly
vice
for the
ples of violations of
constitutional
made
difficult
alleged
to show that
not ration-
requirement's]” that must be
ally
government’s
justiciable
claim.
related to
interests.
raise a
101-09,
Bradley,
638. Zombro has
such a See
99 S.Ct. at
id. at
See
944-48; Murgia,
He has asserted a
constitutional violation.
427 U.S. at
discrimination,
However,
a claim S.Ct. at 2667-69.
the likelihood
claim based
*14
Supreme
ultimately
equal
that a
lose an
plaintiff
Court and our
Cir-
will
that the
own
challenge
protection
make his or
willing to examine
does not
cuit have been
non-justiciable.
her
claim
Protection Clause.
Here,
heavy
would
bur-
majority
Zombro
bear
attempts
sup
also
to derive
protection challenge
equal
den
his
even
argument by
its
port
non-justiciability
depart-
prove
police
if he
were to
emphasizing
brought
has
his
Zombro
age:
ment
him
of his
transferred
against
police department,
par
“a
amilitary department,
challenging
judg-
legislative
where internal disci
“[T]hose
public
pline
safety require
police
court that
ment must convince the
on
commissioner be afforded broad discretion
facts
which the classifica-
authority
assign
reassign
apparently
mem
tion is
based could not reason-
department
ably
gov-
posts.”
to various
be conceived
be true
bers
fact in no way
That
makes Zombro’sconsti
ernmental decisionmaker.” Vance v.
93, 111,
non-justiciable,
Bradley,
tutional claim
the Su
In
preme
In a
Murgia,
Court has illustrated.15
case
this,
plaintiff
carry
Court allowed Massachu
such as
can
this
submitting
police
equal
to assert an
burden
evidence to
setts state
officer
show
grounds
legisla-
asserted
for the
protection claim
on
discrimina
any
2562. Three
tive classification lack
reasonable
tion. 427 U.S.
fact,
later,
foreign
support
ser
but
is none-
years
allowed
this burden
officers,
performed hazardous
theless a considerable one.
who
vice
win,
Johnson,
grounds.
(firefight-
question
not who should
but
See
101 L.Ed.2d
though equal protection chal a successful
lenge be unlike See, impossible.
ly, e.g., it is not McMahon (S.D.N. Barclay,
Y.1981) (invalidating, under rational-basis
test, provision New York Civil Law Service
prohibiting persons employment of over officers). police 29 as
We should remand Zombro’s pro-
claim to district court for further
ceedings. We do not us have before grounds
asserted on which the Baltimore
police department apparently based its al-
leged practice transferring older officers
away fact, from the Inner Harbor.
police department denies that it has such a
practice and asserts that Zombro was age.
transferred for reasons other than
Thus, we are unable to conduct the neces-
sary scrutiny rational-basis on the record remand, might
before us. On Zombro claim,
succeed his but he should be
given try. the chance to *15 America,
UNITED STATES
Plaintiff-Appellee, PRINCE, Jr.,
William B.
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 87-6008
Summary Calendar. Appeals,
United States Court of
Fifth Circuit.
Feb. Rehearing and on Denial of
Order 2, 1989.
Rehearing En Banc March
