Anthony A. Jones, ll v. State, 889 S.E.2d 590

At ages 16 and 17, Anthony Jones committed first-degree burglary and armed robbery; because subsection 63-19-20(1) excluded persons 16+ charged with certain felonies from the family-court definition of "child," he was prosecuted in circuit court and pleaded guilty at 18.
The circuit court sentenced Jones to the statutory minimums: 15 years for burglary and 10 years for armed robbery, to run concurrently.
Jones filed post-conviction relief (PCR) arguing (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate youth-related mitigation and (2) that subsection 63-19-20(1) (the "automatic waiver"/definitional provision) is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it prevents juvenile-focused consideration.
The PCR court dismissed his application, treating the constitutional challenge as non-cognizable and finding the statute constitutional; Jones appealed only the constitutional challenge to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held the PCR claim was cognizable, concluded subsection 63-19-20(1) is constitutional, but directed circuit courts to consider the Aiken mitigating factors of youth when sentencing juveniles covered by the subsection; no separate Aiken hearing is required.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Cognizability of statutory constitutional challenge in PCR	Jones: constitutional challenge to §63-19-20(1) may be raised in PCR because it alleges a constitutional violation that could arise after appeal period	State: claim was a direct-appeal/trial error not cognizable in PCR	Held: Cognizable in PCR; petitioner properly raised it collateral attack under §17-27-20(A)(1)
Constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1) under Eighth Amendment	Jones: automatic exclusion from family court prevents adequate consideration of youth/Miller factors, yielding harsher adult sentencing	State: no constitutional right to family-court adjudication; statute is within legislative authority	Held: Subsection is constitutional; does not violate Eighth Amendment
Requirement to apply juvenile mitigating factors (Aiken/Miller) when juveniles prosecuted under the subsection	Jones: circuit court cannot adequately consider youth absent family-court procedures	State: circuit court may sentence within statutory framework	Held: Circuit courts must consider Aiken mitigating factors when sentencing juveniles under the subsection, but a separate Aiken hearing is not required
Adequacy of Jones's sentencing on the record	Jones: plea/sentencing did not sufficiently explore youth-related mitigation	State: plea court addressed background and Jones understood plea; sentencing proper	Held: Plea court sufficiently considered Aiken factors on the record; sentences affirmed

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juvenile offenders unconstitutional; individualized consideration required)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (execution of offenders under 18 unconstitutional)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life-without-parole for nonhomicide juvenile offender unconstitutional)
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (Miller does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility before life-without-parole)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller rule retroactive on collateral review)
Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 (2014) (enumerated mitigating factors of youth required for juvenile life-without-parole sentencing)
State v. Smith, 428 S.C. 417 (2019) (mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles do not necessarily violate Eighth Amendment)
State v. Slocumb, 426 S.C. 297 (2019) (declining to extend Graham to de facto life sentences)