30 Cal. App. 5th 602
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- BB&K served as AVEK’s general counsel from 1987 to Jan 2016 (Michael Riddell of BB&K was AVEK’s general counsel); starting in 2004 BB&K also began representing Los Angeles County Water District No. 40 (District No. 40) in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Adjudication (AVGA).
- AVEK was not an original defendant in the AVGA; when AVEK later entered the litigation it retained separate counsel (Brunick) for the adjudication while retaining BB&K for unrelated matters.
- From 2004–2015 BB&K concurrently represented District No. 40 in the AVGA and provided non-AVGA services to AVEK; AVEK, via separate counsel, advanced claims (e.g., return-flow rights, fee apportionment) that could conflict with District No. 40 yet did not object to BB&K’s dual role for more than a decade.
- The court approved a global settlement and entered final judgment in December 2015 resolving disputes between AVEK and District No. 40.
- In early 2016 AVEK terminated BB&K, then demanded BB&K stop representing District No. 40; seven months later AVEK moved to disqualify BB&K for concurrent/conflicting representation, alleging lack of an informed written waiver.
- The trial court denied disqualification, finding (inter alia) implied/informed consent from AVEK and unreasonable, prejudicial delay; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (AVEK) | Defendant's Argument (District No. 40/BB&K) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether concurrent representation without a written waiver requires automatic disqualification | Lack of a written informed consent per former Rule 3-310 mandates disqualification | Court may consider consent by conduct, delay, prejudice, and other equitable factors | Court affirmed denial: implied/informed consent by conduct can bar disqualification and is not defeated by absence of a writing |
| Whether AVEK’s long delay in moving to disqualify estops relief | Delay irrelevant if automatic disqualification rule applies | Delay is relevant; extreme delay causing prejudice can bar disqualification | Held delay (10+ years) was unreasonable and highly prejudicial; estoppel supports denial |
| Whether risk of misuse of confidential information required disqualification | Focus on per se rule; written waiver required to cure loyalty/confidentiality concerns | No evidence BB&K used or possessed AVEK confidences relevant to AVGA; concurrent AVGA representation had ended | Court found no proof of confidentiality breach risk; disqualification unnecessary |
| Standard of review and deference to trial court findings | AVEK contends application of per se rule was legal, not factual | Trial court factual findings (implied consent, prejudice) supported by substantial evidence | Abuse of discretion standard; trial court findings supported by substantial evidence — affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Flatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.4th 275 (Cal. 1994) (distinguishes successive vs. simultaneous conflicts; simultaneous representation often triggers automatic disqualification)
- People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal.4th 1135 (Cal. 1999) (disqualification motions are equitable; courts may weigh delay, prejudice, and other equitable factors)
- River West, Inc. v. Nickel, 188 Cal.App.3d 1297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (unreasonable delay and prejudice can imply waiver or consent and bar disqualification)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 72 Cal.App.4th 1422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (rejects implied consent on facts; recognizes timeliness and knowledge are critical to implied-consent analysis)
- Blue Water Sunset, LLC v. Markowitz, 192 Cal.App.4th 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reiterates that simultaneous representation generally leads to automatic disqualification, but did not foreclose consideration of context)
- Elliott v. McFarland Unified School Dist., 165 Cal.App.3d 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (implied consent may be found from conduct and agreements; written waiver is not always the only basis for consent)
