Annise D. Parker, Mayor, Anna Russell, City Secretary, and City of Houston v. David B. Wilson, 01-15-00687-CV

Background

In May 2014 Houston City Council adopted the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance (HERO), which among other things defined “gender identity.”
The ordinance was subject to referendum efforts and litigation; the Texas Supreme Court ordered the ordinance submitted to voters in November 2015.
On July 9, 2015 David B. Wilson presented a petition to the City Secretary seeking to alter the ordinance’s definition of “gender identity”; the City Secretary rejected the petition as untimely and nonconforming to city charter requirements.
Wilson filed an original petition for a district-court writ of mandamus (initially seeking mandatory injunctive relief) and, after amendment, proceeded to a July 28 hearing; he offered no evidence at the hearing.
The trial court entered an order directing the City Secretary to count and certify the petition signatures within 30 days — an immediately effective order compelling affirmative action.
The City filed an interlocutory appeal and asked this Court to assert jurisdiction, arguing the July 28 order is a mandatory temporary injunction appealable under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the July 28 order is an appealable temporary injunction	Wilson styled relief as a writ of mandamus and argued the order was a mandamus ruling	City contends the order is a mandatory temporary injunction in form and function and thus interlocutory-appealable	Court advised to treat the order as a temporary injunction (appealable) because character and function, not label, control
Whether a district-court mandamus proceeding permits immediate mandatory relief without following injunctive procedures	Wilson sought immediate enforcement via mandamus	City argues district-court mandamus is a civil action and immediate relief requires following Texas injunctive rules (Rules 680–693)	Mandamus in district court does not bypass temporary-injunction requirements; immediate mandatory relief must meet injunction procedures
Whether labeling an order as mandamus avoids interlocutory review	Wilson relied on nomenclature to avoid interlocutory jurisdiction	City argues Qwest and related authority prohibit evasion of appellate review by form alone	Form cannot defeat appellate jurisdiction when order functions as an injunction; Qwest controls
Whether the trial court abused discretion by issuing the order without adequate notice, evidence, or compliance with injunction rules	Wilson proceeded on short notice and without evidentiary hearing	City argues the court abused discretion by granting mandatory relief without summary-judgment-type procedures or injunctive safeguards	City contends abuse of discretion occurred; appellate review appropriate (City asks court to vacate and remand)

Key Cases Cited

Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2000) (an order’s character and function, not its label, determine whether it is a temporary injunction and thus appealable)
In re Hardwick, 426 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (an injunction may be prohibitive or mandatory; review focuses on function)
Helix Energy Solutions Grp. v. Howard, 452 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014) (order requiring affirmative payments held to be a mandatory temporary injunction despite different styling)
Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012) (general rule that appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments)
CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (statutory interlocutory-appeal exceptions to final-judgment rule)
Plant Process Equip., Inc. v. Harris, 579 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979) (orders labeled otherwise but functioning as temporary injunctions are appealable)
Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1992) (form does not control an order’s status; courts should look to character and function)