406 F. App'x 150
9th Cir.2010Background
- Waisgerber appeals a district court judgment dismissing with prejudice her § 1983 and state-law claims against the City of Los Angeles and LAPD Captain Kane arising from her termination as a volunteer LAPD Reserve Officer.
- She alleges she was terminated because of sex and in retaliation for First Amendment activity challenging a neglect-of-duty charge.
- The district court dismissed the First Amended Complaint; the dismissal occurred without the district court or parties knowing counsel was dying of brain cancer.
- The panel concludes the dismissal may be salvaged by amendment and remands to permit a Second Amended Complaint.
- The court discusses whether unpaid volunteers can be considered employees for Title VII/FEHA purposes based on “substantial benefits,” and notes the Los Angeles Administrative Code’s labeling of reserve officers as non-employees cannot override state statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Waisgerber can state Title VII/FEHA discrimination claims via §1983 | Waisgerber seeks Title VII coverage through §1983 for sex discrimination. | No employee status under Title VII/FEHA, thus no Title VII/FEHA claim via §1983. | Remand to potentially save by amendment; employee status may be established. |
| Whether Waisgerber qualifies as an employee under Title VII/FEHA as a volunteer | Substantial benefits or compensation can render a volunteer an employee. | Volunteer status typically lacks compensation; no employee relationship. | Amendment may plead substantial benefits to create an employee relationship. |
| Whether California Labor Code § 1102.5 retaliation claim can be saved | Retaliation claim may be viable if employer action followed protected activity. | No viable amendment established under current pleading. | Amendment could support a viable claim if employee status is established. |
| Whether due process or First Amendment retaliation claims are viable | Due process benefits and public-concern speech protection could sustain claims. | Claims require viable underlying status and protected speech context. | Remand to determine viability with amended facts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fichman v. Media Center, 512 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (volunteers can be non-employees for some statutes; remuneration factors matter)
- Mendoza v. Town of Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (compensation required for FEHA employee status; substantial benefits may suffice)
- Murray v. Principal Financial Group, 613 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (Title VII employee definition requires a business/employment connection)
- Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980) (employment connection need not be direct)
- Reid v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (an agency approach to employee status in federal statutes)
- Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993) (due process/characterization of benefits contexts in employment claims)
- Gibson v. Office of the Attorney General, 561 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (First Amendment retaliation where speech concerns public matter)
- Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard for reviewing dismissals with leave to amend)
- City of New York v. United States, 359 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (remuneration need not be salary but substantial benefits)
- Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993) (Title VII coverage of volunteers is fact-dependent)
- Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpaid volunteer researcher lacked typical employee benefits)
