Anita Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland
766 F.3d 580
6th Cir.2014Background
- Loyd, an African-American woman, worked 25 years as a hospital security guard and was terminated in July 2011 after a June 16, 2011 incident with an agitated psychiatric patient.
- Loyd alleges the termination was due to age, race, and sex; the hospital contends it was for a major policy violation.
- Loyd had prior discipline: 2001 warning for questioning staff about restraint in a similar incident, 2004 warning for refusing overtime, and 2010 final-writing-warning for a major infraction.
- During the June 16 incident Loyd questioned restraint procedures and did not assist in restraining the patient; other guards ultimately restrained her, after which Loyd stayed in the room.
- Internal investigation (PEERS) produced witness statements; a five-line PEERS excerpt was included in a hospital summary to the EEOC/MDCR; the full PEERS report was withheld as privileged.
- Loyd was terminated July 1, 2011; the union denied arbitration; Loyd later filed EEOC/MDCR charges and a federal suit; discovery and pretrial disputes arose over the PEERS report and surveillance video.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discovery of PEERS report and sanctions | Loyd asserts privilege was waived and seeks full PEERS report; sanctions for video preservation failures. | PEERS report is privileged; no waiver by excerpt; no sanctions required. | District court did not err |
| Prima facie case for race/sex discrimination | Loyd shows she was qualified and replacement was outside protected classes, or similarly situated others treated differently. | Loyd was not shown to be treated differently; replaced by an African-American woman; no prima facie case. | No genuine issue; granted summary judgment for hospital |
| Age discrimination: prima facie case and pretext | Loyd met qualification and hospital’s reasons were pretextual; pretext evidence disputed. | Even if prima facie proven, hospital’s reasons were honestly believed; no pretext under honest-belief rule. | District court erred on prima facie analysis but upheld on pretext via honest-belief rule |
| Michigan common-law claims and LMRA preemption | Common-law claims survive LMRA preemption; should go to jury. | LMRA §301 preempts these state-law claims as they relate to the CBA. | Intentional interference preempted; intentional infliction not viable as independent tort claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2006) (applies McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII/ELCRA claims)
- Geiger v. Tower Automotive, 579 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2009) (prima facie burden and pretext in age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas)
- Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009) (honest-belief rule allows summary judgment when employer reasonably relied on facts)
- Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2012) (employer need not prove perfection of investigation to trigger honest-belief rule)
- Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998) (employer not required to conduct perfect investigation before termination)
- Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (privilege treated as sword and shield; waiver considerations in discovery)
- Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004) (LMRA preempts state-law claims when rights created by CBA)
- Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 1996) (mere discharge does not equal extreme and outrageous conduct for IIED)