Andrus v. Texas
590 U.S. 806
SCOTUS2020Background
- Terence Andrus, from a childhood of severe neglect, exposure to parental drug-dealing/prostitution, and family violence, became primary caretaker for his siblings and suffered early mental-health problems and trauma.
- At 16 he was confined in juvenile facilities where he endured psychotropic medication, prolonged isolation, and self-harm; after release he committed a deadly carjacking in 2008 and was charged with capital murder.
- At trial defense counsel conceded guilt, conducted almost no mitigation investigation, presented only a few poorly prepared witnesses (including a hostile mother), and offered little rebuttal to the State’s aggravation evidence; the jury sentenced Andrus to death.
- On state habeas review an 8-day evidentiary hearing produced extensive, readily available mitigating evidence (childhood abuse/neglect, trauma, mental illness, TYC harms); the state trial court found counsel ineffective and recommended a new punishment hearing.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a one-sentence denial of relief under Strickland without analysis; the Supreme Court held counsel’s performance was deficient but remanded for the CCA to address Strickland prejudice in the first instance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s mitigation investigation met Strickland’s performance prong | Counsel performed almost no mitigation investigation and failed to pursue obvious leads | Trial record and CCA denial imply no reversible deficiency shown | SCOTUS: Counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient (Strickland prong 1) |
| Whether deficient performance prejudiced the verdict (Strickland prong 2) | There is a reasonable probability at least one juror would have voted differently given the "tidal wave" of mitigation | CCA concluded Andrus failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome | SCOTUS: Unclear whether CCA adequately analyzed prejudice; remanded for CCA to address prejudice under correct legal standards |
| Whether counsel’s limited mitigation and failure to investigate aggravated evidence harmed the defense | Limited, unprepared mitigation (including a hostile mother) bolstered State’s case; counsel failed to investigate or rebut aggravating proofs | State emphasizes strong aggravation evidence of violent history and danger to society | SCOTUS: These failures support finding of deficient performance and bear on prejudice inquiry to be resolved on remand |
| Procedural question whether lower court addressed prejudice meaningfully | CCA’s terse order did not engage with the record-intensive prejudice inquiry required by Strickland/Sears | Dissent: language shows CCA decided prejudice; remand unnecessary | SCOTUS: Because the CCA’s analysis of prejudice is unclear or possibly inadequate, remand is appropriate for the CCA to evaluate prejudice first |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to conduct thorough mitigation investigation; reasonableness assessed under prevailing norms)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (mitigation investigation obligations and prejudice analysis)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) (failure to investigate background can constitute deficient performance in capital cases)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (counsel must investigate prosecution’s aggravating evidence and file materials used against defendant)
- Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (per curiam) (prejudice analysis must weigh newly uncovered mitigation alongside trial mitigation)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (prejudice requires a substantial—not merely conceivable—likelihood of a different outcome)