Andrews v. Target Pharmacy, 714 F. App'x 4

Frank Andrews was allegedly dispensed pills at 10× the prescribed dosage by Target Pharmacy and ingested them in Sept. 2009, later suffering renal failure and related injuries; his wife Robin sued derivatively.
Plaintiffs sued in Massachusetts state court; case removed to federal district court on diversity grounds and Massachusetts substantive law applied.
The district court set expert-disclosure deadlines (initially July 1, 2015, then extended to Dec. 21, then finally to Feb. 9, 2016); plaintiffs repeatedly missed deadlines and only later produced a report from Dr. Steven Gabardi.
The district court precluded any expert testimony other than Dr. Gabardi’s (whose report expressly declined to offer an opinion on medical causation), denied plaintiffs’ motion to reopen discovery, and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs appealed, arguing improper preclusion of experts, an entitlement to reopen discovery, insufficiency of summary judgment, and entitlement to a medical malpractice tribunal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60B.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused discretion by precluding expert testimony for failure to comply with disclosure orders	Preclusion was improper; plaintiffs were entitled to offer expert testimony	Preclusion was appropriate given repeated missed deadlines and prejudice to defendant	No abuse of discretion; preclusion upheld
Whether plaintiffs should have been allowed to reopen discovery	Plaintiffs sought leave to reopen discovery citing counsel health problems	Defendant opposed reopening as untimely and prejudicial	Denial of reopening was not an abuse of discretion
Whether summary judgment was improper because plaintiffs raised disputed factual issues on causation	Plaintiffs argued causation could be shown without expert testimony or through lay evidence	Defendant argued causation requires expert medical testimony and plaintiffs offered no causation expert	Summary judgment affirmed: causation required expert testimony and none was offered (Dr. Gabardi disclaimed causation opinion)
Whether the case belonged before a medical malpractice tribunal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60B	Plaintiffs contended the statute entitled them to tribunal treatment	Defendant argued statute applies to "providers of health care," not a retail pharmacy	Pharmacy not a "provider of health care" under the statute; no tribunal required

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (gives governing choice-of-law principle that state substantive law controls in diversity cases)
Summers v. Fin. Freedom Acq. LLC, 807 F.3d 351 (1st Cir.) (applies Erie principle in the First Circuit)
Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45 (1st Cir.) (standard of review for discovery-related preclusion orders)
Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239 (1st Cir.) (supports preclusion sanction for discovery violations)
Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.) (lists factors and heightened justification required when preclusion has serious case-dispositive effects)
Milward v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 820 F.3d 469 (1st Cir.) (states Massachusetts rule that expert testimony is ordinarily required to prove medical causation)
Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (standard of review for summary judgment determinations)
Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.) (addresses significance of failing to seek continuance when circumstances exist that might justify delay)