Andrew Scadden v. Todd Werner, 677 F. App'x 996

Background

In Jan. 2013 police responded to a tenant/landlord dispute at Andrew Scadden’s home; officers allegedly entered with guns drawn, ordered him to the ground, and an unidentified officer allegedly performed a "flying kick," after which Scadden lost consciousness and was arrested.
Scadden pled guilty weeks later to three charges arising from the incident (possession attempt, resisting/obstructing, domestic violence) and subsequently sued three Warren, MI officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and various Michigan tort claims (assault/battery, IIED, false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution).
Discovery deadlines were extended once, but no depositions of defendants were taken before the dispositive-motion cutoff; defendants moved for dismissal/summary judgment, asserting lack of evidence and qualified immunity.
The district court granted defendants' motion: dismissed most claims for lack of evidentiary support at summary judgment and dismissed malicious prosecution under Rule 12(b)(6); it later denied Scadden’s motion for reconsideration.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Scadden failed to comply with Rule 56(d) or show diligence in pursuing discovery and that the record contained no evidence permitting a reasonable jury to find for him.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether summary judgment was premature because plaintiff needed more discovery	Scadden argued discovery was ongoing and necessary to identify each officer’s role	Officers argued discovery deadline passed and plaintiff offered no Rule 56(d) affidavit or diligence	Held: No abuse of discretion; plaintiff failed to file Rule 56(d) or show diligence, so summary judgment was proper
Whether defendants met their summary judgment burden on § 1983 excessive-force claim	Scadden contended defendants didn’t meet burden, and he couldn’t identify which officer kicked him	Defendants argued they met initial burden by showing absence of evidence and challenged Scadden to produce facts	Held: Defendants met Celotex burden; Scadden rested on allegations and produced no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact
Whether burden should shift to defendants because plaintiff could not identify the kicking officer	Scadden invoked Dubner-style rule to shift burden of production	Defendants argued Dubner inapplicable; no evidence of defendant stonewalling; burden-shift not warranted	Held: No burden shift; Sixth Circuit has declined to adopt extended Dubner rule for excessive-force claims and facts do not justify it here
Whether malicious-prosecution claim survived 12(b)(6)	Scadden alleged malicious prosecution generally arising from the arrest	Defendants argued complaint lacked allegations that officers knowingly swore false affidavits or facts showing lack of probable cause	Held: Dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); complaint failed to plead facts raising claim above speculation

Key Cases Cited

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment governs excessive-force claims)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant can meet summary-judgment burden by showing absence of evidence)
Vance v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145 (6th Cir. 1996) (summary judgment based on lack of evidence permissible if nonmovant had adequate discovery opportunity)
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2002) (nonmovant must inform court of need for discovery)
Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1995) (absence of Rule 56(d) affidavit ordinarily precludes challenge to adequacy of discovery)
F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2014) (denial of additional discovery reviewed for abuse of discretion; diligence is key)
Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2001) (burden-shifting to defendants in false-arrest cases when plaintiff cannot identify officers due to defendant stonewalling)
Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016) (declining to extend Dubner burden-shift to excessive-force claims in this circuit)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must plead facts that raise a right to relief above speculative level)
Hood v. Hood, 59 F.3d 40 (6th Cir. 1995) (post-judgment motions filed within Rule 59 deadline may be treated as Rule 59(e) motions permitting review of underlying judgment)