127 F.4th 1019
6th Cir.2025Background
- In March 2020 Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear issued COVID-19 emergency orders (mask mandate/indoor dining prohibition). Brewed’s owner Andrew Cooperrider posted criticism on personal and business social media.
- On November 25, 2020 the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC) issued an emergency suspension and notice of violation against Brewed based on (1) alleged violation of the Governor’s orders and (2) an independent disorderly-conduct incident involving an inspector.
- A DABC hearing occurred in May 2021; on March 4, 2022 DABC revoked Brewed’s alcohol licenses; Brewed appealed in state court (state proceedings remain ongoing).
- Cooperrider sued Governor Beshear and multiple executive-branch and DABC officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation and procedural and substantive due-process violations; defendants moved to dismiss.
- The district court dismissed all claims on immunity and pleading grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed most dismissals (absolute, qualified, and sovereign immunity) but reversed as to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim against Beshear, Perry, and Duke and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absolute immunity for DABC general counsel (Newton) and agency heads (Woods, Taylor) for enforcement/adjudicatory acts | Newton/Woods/Taylor acted to punish Cooperrider for speech; immunity should not bar accountability | Their functions were quasi-prosecutorial (Newton) or quasi-judicial (Woods/Taylor); absolute immunity applies | Newton entitled to absolute quasi-prosecutorial immunity; Woods and Taylor entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity — dismissal of individual-capacity damages claims affirmed |
| Qualified immunity for Governor Beshear, Perry, and Duke on First Amendment retaliation claim | Cooperrider pleaded protected speech, adverse action (license suspension/revocation), and causation (directives, emails, refusal to settle because of speech) | Complaint is conclusory; time gap and legitimate regulatory reasons defeat causation; officials entitled to qualified immunity | Complaint plausibly alleged retaliation; qualified immunity reversed as to First Amendment claim and case remanded for further proceedings |
| Substantive due process (arbitrary deprivation of license) | Continuation of enforcement after intervening legislation rendered action baseless; deprivation of property was arbitrary/conscience-shocking | State had legitimate regulatory interest; enforcement was rationally related to that interest | Complaint failed to plausibly allege conscience-shocking conduct; qualified immunity affirmed for substantive-due-process claims |
| Procedural due process (biased adjudication / inadequate process) | Defendants’ personal animus permeated decision; hearing result invalid | Cooperrider received notice and an adversarial hearing; adjudicators not alleged to have adjudicated after personal involvement; absolute immunity bars some defendants | Complaint did not plausibly allege procedural-due-process violation; qualified immunity (and absolute immunity for Woods/Taylor individually) affirmed |
| Official-capacity claims / sovereign immunity (Eleventh Amendment / Ex parte Young) | Seeks injunctive relief (reissuance of license) for ongoing violation | Eleventh Amendment bars official-capacity suits unless a continuing violation is alleged; most harms are past | Sovereign immunity bars official-capacity First Amendment and procedural claims; substantive-due-process injunctive claim falls within Ex parte Young but fails on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1976) (absolute prosecutorial immunity for actions intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1978) (absolute immunity for agency officials performing adjudicatory functions)
- Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (U.S. 1985) (factors for extending absolute immunity to nonjudicial officers)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (U.S. 1988) (functional approach: immunity depends on nature of function, not identity)
- Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (applying quasi-judicial immunity to state licensing board members)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard: plausible factual allegations required)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading plausibility standard)
- Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (elements and adverse-action standard for First Amendment retaliation)
- Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (examples of adverse actions sufficient for retaliation claims)
- Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1994) (First Amendment protection against retaliation)