Andrea Santiago v. City of Chicago, 19 F.4th 1010

Andrea Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, owned a wheelchair‑accessible van that was parked on the street for long periods and was deemed "abandoned" under Chicago ordinance; a tow‑notice sticker was affixed and the van was later towed, impounded, and ultimately disposed of.
Santiago relies on her daughter Lisandra Velez for transportation and English translation; Velez removed the tow sticker and moved the van shortly after but did not inform Santiago.
The City mailed two identical Vehicle Impoundment Notices the same day; Santiago disputes receiving them; her daughter attempted retrieval but was told the van had been destroyed.
Santiago sued the City on behalf of two proposed classes (a Tow Class and a Vehicle‑Disposal Class) asserting due‑process, takings, unjust enrichment, and related claims; the district court denied Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive certification but certified both classes under Rule 23(b)(3).
The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding the district court abused its discretion by failing to perform the required rigorous Rule 23 analysis (notably: not framing certification around the elements of the underlying claims, unclear class/claim organization, and insufficient adequacy and predominance reasoning).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether common questions predominate under Rule 23(b)(3)	Classwide questions (notice sufficiency; constitutionality of city practices) predominate and are suitable for class adjudication	Individualized issues (actual notice, varying circumstances) predominate and defeat class treatment	The court held the district court failed to analyze claim elements to resolve predominance; certification vacated and remanded for rigorous analysis
Adequacy of representative under Rule 23(a)(4)	Santiago is an adequate representative for both classes	Santiago faces a unique defense (actual notice via daughter) that could make her inadequate	The court held the district court’s adequacy analysis was insufficient and remanded for proper assessment
Need to tie certification analysis to elements of underlying claims	Santiago framed facial challenges to ordinance, arguing individual circumstances do not matter	City argued district court must analyze each claim’s elements to identify common vs. individual issues	The court insisted certification must begin with claim elements (Erica P. John principle); district court’s failure to do so was error
Certification of (b)(2) injunctive classes	Sought injunctive relief classes	Santiago lacks a real and immediate threat of future injury, so (b)(2) is improper	District court correctly declined (b)(2) certification for injunctive relief due to lack of imminent injury

Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for class‑certification abuse of discretion)
Reliable Money Ord., Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc., 704 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing abuse of discretion in class‑certification rulings)
CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (adequacy and conflicts of interest in class representation)
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) (burden on party seeking certification; Rule 23 requirements)
Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018) (Rule 23(a) prerequisites and 23(b)(3) predominance)
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011) (predominance inquiry should begin with elements of the underlying cause of action)
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013) (Rule 23(b)(3) requires common questions to predominate, not merits resolution)
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (class cohesion and certification standards)
Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing common vs. individual questions based on required evidence)
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (actual notice issue in due‑process/notice contexts)
Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2012) (managing intra‑class conflicts; subclasses as a remedy)