Andre Martello Barton v. U.S. Attorney General
904 F.3d 1294
11th Cir.2018Background
- Andre Barton, a lawful permanent resident admitted in 1989, committed several crimes in 1996 and later; only the 1996 offenses are relevant to cancellation eligibility.
- Barton applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2), which requires 7 years of continuous residence after admission.
- The stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), ends continuous residence when an alien commits an offense listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that "renders" the alien inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2) or removable under § 1227(a)(2)/(a)(4).
- The government argued Barton’s 1996 conviction triggered the stop-time rule by rendering him inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2); Barton contended a resident not seeking admission cannot be "rendered inadmissible."
- The IJ and a single-member BIA agreed with the government and pretermitted Barton’s cancellation application; Barton petitioned for review in the Eleventh Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission can be "rendered inadmissible" under § 1229b(d)(1) for stop-time purposes | Barton: "Inadmissible" requires seeking admission; an admitted resident not seeking readmission cannot be rendered inadmissible | Government: A qualifying conviction can "render" an alien inadmissible as a status regardless of current admission-seeking | Held: A lawful permanent resident need not be seeking admission to be "rendered inadmissible" for stop-time purposes; the conviction-based inadmissibility is a status that can exist even if latent |
| Whether the stop-time provision is ambiguous such that agency deference (Chevron) is required | Barton: Text favors limiting "inadmissible" to admission contexts; avoid surplusage by dividing inadmissibility/removability roles | Government/BIA: Plain text supports conviction-based inadmissibility triggering stop-time; agency interpretation reasonable | Held: Court found the statutory text unambiguous at Chevron step one; no need to defer to the single-member BIA decision |
| Whether applying the "inadmissible" prong would render the "removable" prong surplusage | Barton: If any § 1182(a)(2) offense automatically renders inadmissible, the removable clause is superfluous | Court/Government: Two distinct requirements exist—commission vs. conviction/admission—so no surplusage | Held: No surplusage; the prefatory clause (commission) and the operative clause (conviction/admission rendering inadmissible or removable) are distinct |
Key Cases Cited
- Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2017) (holds conviction can trigger stop-time by rendering resident inadmissible)
- Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 2015) (interprets stop-time to allow inadmissibility-based stopping for residents)
- INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (Chevron deference applies to BIA statutory interpretations)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for agency deference)
- Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (discusses Chevron application in immigration context)
- Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008) (limits Chevron deference for non-precedential single-member BIA decisions)