Andrade v. Purviance CA1/1
A161331
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 23, 2021Background
- Andrade received a Mendocino County traffic ticket; a failure-to-appear led to a DMV license suspension. She was later arrested in Lake County while driving with a suspended license and charged with misdemeanor battery on a peace officer, resisting arrest, and driving on a suspended license.
- Lorraine Purviance was appointed as Andrade’s criminal defense counsel; a jury convicted Andrade on all three counts.
- Andrade pursued postconviction relief (habeas petition) and appealed her criminal conviction; both challenges were denied.
- Andrade sued Purviance (and another attorney) in civil court alleging legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, a §1983 claim, and breach of good faith and fair dealing, asserting counsel failed to raise defenses (e.g., challenges to DMV suspension).
- Purviance demurred, arguing Andrade failed to plead actual innocence/exoneration by postconviction relief — a prerequisite for malpractice arising from criminal defense.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment; the Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Andrade stated a legal malpractice claim arising from a criminal case | Purviance’s failures to raise DMV/jurisdictional defenses deprived Andrade of a competent defense and would have exonerated her | Under Coscia, malpractice from criminal defense requires postconviction exoneration (actual innocence); Andrade did not allege this | Demurrer sustained; malpractice claim fails for lack of alleged postconviction exoneration |
| Whether non-malpractice causes (fraud, §1983, breach of good faith) require proof of actual innocence | These claims arise from counsel’s professional conduct and would be viable without exoneration | These claims are essentially malpractice in different garb and therefore require the same exoneration showing | Court held all causes premised on counsel’s representation require alleged postconviction exoneration and dismissed them |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend | Andrade asserted she could be exonerated but did not proffer amended pleadings | Purviance noted no proposed amendment and the record shows no postconviction relief | Denial of leave to amend affirmed because Andrade did not propose amendments or show she could plead exoneration |
| Whether court needed to adjudicate Andrade’s substantive challenges to the conviction (e.g., Rios/Bell arguments, court jurisdiction, verified complaint) | Andrade argued the license suspension violated due process (Rios/Bell) and other defects undermined the conviction | Purviance argued these issues do not cure the pleading defect for malpractice claims | Court declined to reach those merits because the dispositive defect was failure to allege postconviction exoneration |
Key Cases Cited
- Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 (Cal. 2001) (criminal-defense malpractice plaintiff must obtain postconviction exoneration to prove actual innocence)
- Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311 (Cal. 1985) (demurrer review standards; leave-to-amend analysis)
- Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal.3d 454 (Cal. 1973) (constitutional due process protections related to license suspension)
- Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (U.S. 1971) (due process required before revocation of certain driver’s license rights)
- Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 (Cal. 1998) (policy considerations on malpractice and shifting responsibility to defense counsel)
- Lynch v. Warwick, 95 Cal.App.4th 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (actual innocence requirement applies to claims premised on counsel’s conduct)