Andrade v. NAACP of Austin
345 S.W.3d 1
| Tex. | 2011Background
- Voters sued the Texas Secretary of State alleging certification of the eSlate paperless DRE violated the Election Code and Texas Constitution.
- The eSlate is a touchscreen, paperless system; it records votes electronically with no contemporaneous paper record.
- Certification of eSlate followed a statutory framework for testing, hearings, and reporting by the SOS; adjudicated under TEX. ELEC.CODE §§ 122.001, .031, .034-.039, .43.007, .122.0331.
- Plaintiffs claimed equal protection violations due to voting disparities and sought declarations and injunctions restricting use of paperless systems absent an independent paper record.
- Trial court denied the SOS’s plea to the jurisdiction; the court of appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted review.
- Court reverses and dismisses the case, holding most claims are generalized grievances and lack standing, while recognizing standing to pursue an equal-protection claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Santana has standing to pursue an equal protection claim | Santana has a concrete, particularized injury due to voting system disparities | Generalized grievance; standing requires distinct injury | Santana has standing to pursue equal protection claim. |
| Whether the disparities between DRE and non-DRE voters confer standing | Disparate treatment among voters creates injury in fact | Disparity alone does not establish standing under generalized grievance rule | Disparity can confer standing in voting-equality context; but need merits analysis on claims. |
| Remainder of article VI, §4 claims are barred for lack of standing | Claims about secret ballot, ballot numbering, and purity are concrete rights | These are generalized grievances about government acts; no individual injury shown | Lacks standing for article VI, §4 claims. |
| Whether article VI, §2(c) suffices to sustain standing given Secretary’s certification | Certification affects suffrage protections directly | §2(c) requires Legislature to regulate elections, not certify machines | §2(c) claim not stated; standing insufficient. |
| Whether Election Code claims provide standing to seek injunctive relief | Certification harms claims under §273.081 injunctive relief | Injunctive-relief provisions require concrete private harm beyond general public interest | No standing for Election Code claims; generalized grievances. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voters may have standing to challenge vote dilution and equal protection)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (sliding scale for voting regulations; not all restrictions require strict scrutiny)
- Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency rules for voting)
- Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (one person, one vote; weight of votes violates equal protection)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ( Legislative apportionment must be equal among voters)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete injury; generalized grievances barred)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing requires individualized and concrete injury)
- Wood v. State ex rel. Lee, 126 S.W.2d 4 (1939) (constitutional purity duties left to Legislature; not courts' role to rewrite)
- Sunset Valley (Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley), 146 S.W.3d 637 (2004) (equal protection claims about geographic disparities distinguish from general grievances)
- Favorito v. Handel, 285 Ga. 795, 684 S.E.2d 257 (2009) (state election systems; standing in equal protection challenges)
- Tex. Dem. Party v. Williams, 285 Fed.Appx. 194 (2008) (federal appellate on equal protection in election context (note: cited for context))