Anderson v. State
564 S.W.3d 592
| Mo. | 2018Background
- Terrance Anderson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder; sentenced to life without parole for Stephen Rainwater and to death for Debbie Rainwater. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal; multiple postconviction proceedings followed.
- After an initial Rule 29.15 proceeding and appellate reversals/remands, Anderson received a new penalty-phase retrial for Debbie’s murder (2008) where trial counsel pursued a mitigation strategy emphasizing lay testimony and had mental-health experts available but chose not to call some experts after Anderson stated he remembered shooting Debbie. He testified and was sentenced to death again.
- Anderson filed successive Rule 29.15 claims attacking trial and appellate counsel’s effectiveness at the penalty retrial (failure to call mitigation witnesses/experts, trial tactics, evidentiary objections, and appellate counsel’s failure to brief proportionality).
- The motion court on remand (after this Court ordered recusal in a prior PCR appeal) conducted an evidentiary hearing, made credibility findings, and denied relief. Anderson appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court (exclusive jurisdiction because of death sentence).
- The court applied Strickland standards, deferred to trial-court credibility determinations, and resolved multiple subclaims (Points I–X), affirming denial of postconviction relief.
Issues
| Issue | Anderson's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to call mitigation witnesses about stepfather Smith's violent past (Point I & II) | Trial counsel were ineffective for not calling Dr. Lewis and Smith's ex-wife to show childhood exposure to violence that would mitigate culpability. | Counsel investigated records, lacked direct nexus tying Smith's remote violence to Anderson, and reasonably chose to present Smith as a positive witness. | Court: No ineffective assistance; strategy reasonable and no strong nexus to Anderson’s upbringing. |
| Failure to call mental-health experts (Dr. Lewis, Dr. Holcomb) (Points III & IV) | Counsel should have called Dr. Lewis/Dr. Holcomb to present psychotic depression, paranoia, dissociation/psychogenic amnesia as mitigation. | Counsel reasonably declined due to credibility concerns about Dr. Lewis, logistical problems, and Anderson’s later revelation he remembered shooting Debbie that undermined experts’ opinions. | Court: No ineffective assistance; motion court found experts’ credibility weak and counsel’s strategy reasonable. |
| Failure to call other lay witnesses re: mental state (Point V) | Counsel failed to call several lay witnesses who would have testified Anderson was disoriented and depressed before/after murders. | Many witnesses were uncooperative, unreachable, had weak or impeachable testimony, or their testimony risked opening door to premeditation evidence. | Court: No ineffective assistance; counsel’s noncalling was reasonable. |
| Failure to timely object to prosecutor asking Anderson whether other witnesses were lying (Point VI) | Counsel’s delayed objection prejudiced Anderson by injecting arbitrariness into penalty phase. | Counsel reasonably chose strategic response (address in closing) and ultimately lodged a meritorious objection that was sustained. | Court: No ineffective assistance; no prejudice shown. |
| Failure to object/redact ex parte order of protection (Point VII) | Counsel should have objected or redacted the ex parte petition because it contained unadjudicated allegations and "good cause" findings. | Ex parte order was admissible in penalty phase as non-statutory aggravator; victim (Abbey) testified and was cross-examined; counsel did object and motion court overruled. | Court: No ineffective assistance; admission was proper and objection would have been nonmeritorious. |
| Advising Anderson to testify (Point VIII) | Counsel were ineffective in advising Anderson to testify; his testimony did not mitigate and risked damaging admissions. | Decision to have defendant testify is client’s choice; counsel reasonably prepared him to humanize, express remorse, and considered strategy after his revelation. | Court: No ineffective assistance; no exceptional circumstances shown. |
| Adoption of prior judge’s findings (Point IX) | Motion court improperly adopted previous judge’s findings wholesale after earlier judge should have recused. | New judge reviewed all prior transcripts and live testimony and made independent credibility findings; some verbatim legal conclusions are permissible. | Court: No error; adoption did not substitute for independent consideration. |
| Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising proportionality (Point X) | Appellate counsel failed to raise statutory proportionality review; this deprived Anderson of a chance to avoid death. | Counsel made a strategic judgment not to raise a claim that had historically failed; Court conducts independent proportionality review and no prejudice shown. | Court: No ineffective assistance; no reasonable probability of different outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (counsel must investigate reasonably available mitigating evidence)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (failure to investigate childhood trauma can be ineffective assistance)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (duty to review prior-conviction records that may reveal mitigation)
- Deck v. State, 303 S.W.3d 527 (Mo. banc 2010) (Missouri proportionality review discussion)
- State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. banc 2002) (direct appeal—Anderson I)
- Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. banc 2006) (Anderson II)
- State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. banc 2010) (Anderson III)
- Anderson v. State, 402 S.W.3d 86 (Mo. banc 2013) (Anderson IV)
- Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892 (Mo. banc 2013) (deference to trial-court findings on counsel effectiveness)