Anderson v. State, 302 Ga. 74

Background

Defendant James Edwin Anderson drove from a vacation to confront Franklin Burch after learning Burch was dating his daughter‑in‑law; he retrieved five firearms from a locked safe, loaded a .308 rifle with one round, and went to Burch’s house at night.
Anderson encountered Burch in the driveway; eyewitness Brittany Anderson saw Anderson approach carrying the rifle, Burch bent over with his hands on the barrel, and the rifle discharged, fatally wounding Burch at near‑contact range.
Anderson later turned himself in and gave a recorded statement saying he intended only to scare Burch and that the rifle discharged accidentally; physical and forensic evidence (DNA, matching projectile, abrasions consistent with the rifle/scope) tied the rifle to the wound.
A jury convicted Anderson of felony murder (aggravated assault underlying), aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during a felony; he was sentenced to life without parole plus five years.
On appeal from denial of his amended motion for new trial, Anderson raised juror misconduct (a juror who worked at the funeral home and embalmed the victim), ineffective assistance of counsel (voir dire, failure to retain experts, failure to request involuntary manslaughter jury charge), and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed: evidence sufficed; juror’s voir dire disclosures were truthful and not disqualifying; trial counsel’s choices were reasonable trial strategy; any prosecutorial remark was harmless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Juror misconduct for nondisclosure/ bias	Juror H concealed extent of his connection to the case (embalmed victim) and was therefore biased; this warrants new trial.	H disclosed funeral‑home employment on voir dire and said he could be impartial; additional details at post‑trial hearing did not show dishonesty or cause for challenge.	No new trial: H answered voir dire honestly; connections were not as extensive as in precedent warranting disqualification; no prejudice shown.
Exposure to extrinsic evidence (embalmer’s viewing)	H’s viewing of the body gave him extrinsic knowledge (abrasions) not available to jurors; Remmer presumption of prejudice applies.	Photographs of wounds were admitted; H testified his verdict was based on courtroom evidence; no private outside contact or influence occurred.	No Remmer relief: circumstances differ from private tampering; evidentiary hearing showed no prejudice; verdict stands.
Ineffective assistance — voir dire and expert investigation	Counsel failed to probe H’s relationships and role and failed to retain firearms/forensics experts to support accidental‑discharge defense.	Counsel questioned extensively, used an investigator, reviewed reports/photos, and made strategic choices not to call experts or to avoid inconsistent jury charges.	No ineffective assistance: counsel’s decisions fell within reasonable trial strategy; appellant cannot show prejudice under Strickland.
Failure to request involuntary manslaughter instruction	Evidence supported involuntary manslaughter as lesser included; counsel’s omission prejudiced appellant.	Involuntary manslaughter is inconsistent with asserted defenses (self‑defense and accident); counsel reasonably declined the charge.	No relief: charge would have been inconsistent with defenses; omission was reasonable and not prejudicial.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
Glover v. State, 274 Ga. 213 (standard for juror nondisclosure/new trial test)
Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510 (juror’s close relationship to victim may require disqualification)
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (private juror tampering is presumptively prejudicial)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335 (harmless‑error analysis for court’s failure to rebuke prosecutor under OCGA § 17‑8‑75)