Anderson v. City of Massillon
134 Ohio St. 3d 380
| Ohio | 2012Background
- Cynthia Anderson sued the city of Massillon and firefighters Toles and Annen for wrongful death arising from a collision between Engine 211 and a minivan driven by Ronald Anderson.
- Engine 211, responding to an emergency, traveled at high speed through a narrow residential intersection with obstructions limiting visibility.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, holding the city had a full defense under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b) and the firefighters had immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).
- The Fifth District reversed, finding questions of recklessness existed and that the terms willful, wanton, and reckless were functionally equivalent.
- This court clarified that willful, wanton, and reckless are distinct standards and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that clarification.
- Statutory framework distinguishes a political subdivision’s full defense from an employee’s immunity, with different conduct thresholds (willful/wanton vs. wanton/reckless).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are willful, wanton, and reckless interchangeable? | Anderson argues they are equivalent, making recklessness sufficient for immunity questions. | Massillon argues they are distinct degrees of care, requiring different proofs for defense and immunity. | They are not interchangeable; they describe different degrees of care. |
| Does the full defense to liability and employee immunity apply under the 2744 framework as clarified? | Appellate court properly found issues of recklessness preclude immunity and defense. | The city and firefighters should receive full defense and immunity if not willful or wanton. | Remanded for further proceedings consistent with clarified terms to determine defense and immunity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Res. Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519 (1934) (distinguishes willful from wanton conduct)
- Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520 (1948) (distinguishes willful from wanton misconduct)
- Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567 (1936) (defines wanton misconduct)
- Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102 (1990) (adopts Restatement recklessness definition)
- O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (2008) (restatement-of-law approach to negligence, recklessness distinction)
- Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351 (1994) (clarifies scope of recklessness and related standards)