Amy Young v. Gary S. Borders
850 F.3d 1274
11th Cir.2017Background
- Late on July 15, 2012, Deputy Sylvester pursued a motorcycle driving ~90 mph, lost sight of it, then was informed another officer found a still-hot motorcycle parked at an apartment complex near Apartment 114.
- Officers (four total) converged on Apartment 114 because lights were on there and the motorcycle and an adjacent vehicle were registered to the same person; they believed the motorcyclist might be armed.
- The officers took tactical positions outside Apartment 114 with guns drawn; Sylvester stood left of the door a few feet off the stoop and knocked loudly (two sets of three knocks) without announcing himself as police.
- When Andrew Scott opened the door holding a handgun (disputed whether pointed at Sylvester or down by Scott’s side) and began a brief backward movement into the apartment, Sylvester shot and killed him within seconds.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Sylvester on excessive-force and search claims, holding (1) the shooting was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and (2) alternatively, Sylvester was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law warned him his conduct was unlawful.
- A three-sentence panel affirmed without opinion; a majority of the circuit denied rehearing en banc. Three judges filed a published concurrence defending the denial; four judges dissented from the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force (shooting when Scott opened door) | Killing was unreasonable: Scott was not a suspect, inside his home, not threatening; disputed facts raise triable issue | Sylvester reasonably perceived imminent threat: prior reports of armed motorcyclist, hot bike at 114, Scott opened door with gun and moved as if to take cover/fire | Panel affirmed district court: no reversible error; district court’s view that an objectively reasonable officer could perceive imminent threat stands (no trial required) |
| Qualified immunity (clearly established law) | Precedent (e.g., Lundgren, Menuel) puts officers on notice that shooting a nonthreatening person in home is unlawful | No prior case with materially similar, particularized facts; Supreme Court requires particularized precedent — officers get breathing room | Held: no clearly established right put Sylvester on fair, clear notice as of July 15, 2012; qualified immunity applies |
| Fourth Amendment "search" / knock-and-talk (entry/approach to door) | Officers’ tactics (surrounding the only exit, guns drawn, pounding the door at 1:30 a.m., no ID) exceeded the knock-and-talk implied license and amounted to a warrantless raid | Approach and knock were within the knock-and-talk exception: officers stayed at front door, did not enter, lights were on in apartment, no evidence occupants were prevented from staying inside | Held: court did not decide constitutional violation on this point; but at minimum no clearly established law put Sylvester on notice that his pre-door conduct was illegal |
| Whether case warrants en banc review / circuit precedent | Plaintiffs: error in immunity analysis and need for guidance; dissenters say published panel reasons absent and important circuit precedent should be clarified | Concurrence: panel’s result correct; facts unique; non-precedential disposition appropriate | Denial of rehearing en banc affirmed; concurrence and dissents published; order non-precedential |
Key Cases Cited
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (assessing Fourth Amendment seizure/reasonableness) (used for excessive-force framework)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective reasonableness standard for use of force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force permissible only where suspect poses immediate threat)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (knock-and-talk implied license; curtilage/front porch expectations)
- Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600 (11th Cir.) (use of deadly force in home where facts suggested no threat; precedent cited by dissent)
- Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (11th Cir.) (officers’ use of force examined where suspect fired first; discussed in distinguishing precedents)