Amy Sanders v. Lamar Jones
845 F.3d 721
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Decatur County officer Lamar Jones supervised a confidential informant (CI) controlled buy; CI later identified Amy Sanders as the seller from a driver’s-license photo and a police report Jones prepared led to a grand-jury indictment for drug sale.
- Jones testified to the grand jury, essentially reading from his police report and stating there was audio/video of the buy; he did not disclose that the video quality was poor.
- Post-indictment, Jones conceded in deposition that a screenshot from the video does not depict Sanders and that he could have seen that before the indictment; charges were later dismissed for misidentification.
- Sanders sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution (and related state claims); district court denied Jones’s claims of absolute and qualified immunity as to malicious prosecution.
- The Sixth Circuit addressed whether Rehberg v. Paulk’s rule granting absolute immunity to grand-jury testimony bars Sanders’s malicious-prosecution claim when she must rebut a grand-jury indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jones is entitled to absolute immunity for his grand-jury testimony under Rehberg | Sanders says her claim rests on Jones’s false police report and investigative omissions, so she can prevail without relying on his grand-jury testimony | Jones invokes Rehberg: grand-jury testimony is absolutely immune and plaintiff cannot base § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims on such testimony | Reversed: Rehberg bars use of grand-jury testimony; if plaintiff must rely on that testimony to defeat immunity, claim fails |
| Whether an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause for malicious-prosecution claims | Sanders: the police report (and other non-testimonial acts) can show lack of probable cause and that Jones influenced prosecution | Jones: an indictment creates a presumption of probable cause that can only be rebutted by proof of knowingly or recklessly false grand-jury testimony (which is immune) | Held that the grand-jury indictment generally conclusively establishes probable cause; Rehberg removes the false-testimony exception when the defendant invokes absolute immunity, so Sanders cannot rebut the presumption via Jones’s grand-jury testimony |
| Whether participation/influence over decision to prosecute can be shown without grand-jury testimony | Sanders: Jones’s police report and pre-grand-jury interactions with the prosecutor show participation | Jones: participation shown only by testimony, which is immune | Court: Participation can be established via false statements to prosecutor or in police report (non-testimonial acts), so this element could be proven without grand-jury testimony |
| Whether Jones is entitled to qualified immunity for preparing the police report | Sanders: report contained reckless/knowing falsehoods and omissions supporting malicious prosecution | Jones: at most qualified immunity applies to investigative, non-testimonial acts; but plaintiff must show constitutional violation | Court: Police-report preparation is not absolutely immune; but because Sanders cannot overcome the indictment’s probable-cause presumption without using immune grand-jury testimony, Jones is entitled to judgment (qualified immunity analysis need not salvage claim) |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (grand‑jury witnesses have absolute immunity for testimony; that immunity cannot be circumvented by using that testimony to support § 1983 claims)
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process, governs malicious prosecution claims alleging lack of probable cause)
- Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010) (elements of § 1983 malicious prosecution: initiation/participation, lack of probable cause, post‑seizure liberty deprivation, favorable termination)
- Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2015) (false or reckless grand‑jury testimony can defeat an indictment’s presumption of probable cause—application limited when absolute immunity is asserted)
- Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2002) (a fair grand‑jury indictment ordinarily conclusively establishes probable cause)
- Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2001) (officer’s knowing false statements to decisionmaker can permit relitigation of probable cause)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (prosecutors have absolute immunity for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process)
- Coggins v. Buonora, 776 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2015) (when Rehberg applies, courts ask whether the § 1983 claim can be proved without resort to grand‑jury testimony)