Amy Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Texas, L.L.C., et a
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9870
| 5th Cir. | 2014Background
- Amy Gorman worked in Verizon’s government sales group and complained to HR in Sept. 2009 that supervisor Jason Smith treated her worse than male colleagues (alleged sex discrimination/harassment).
- After the complaint HR investigated Smith (anonymously), concluded no actionable discrimination, and Gorman stayed in her role before later accepting a different position voluntarily.
- Separately, from Oct. 2009 a group of Verizon employees (the “TDCJ Team”) executed a scheme to generate improper commissions tied to a Texas Department of Criminal Justice deal; the scheme was discovered in Mar–Apr 2010.
- Verizon’s finance and HR investigators reported that Gorman was aware of key aspects of the scheme and had received $1,200 in commissions; Verizon lost about $75,000.
- Verizon’s regional president Kay Henze, after receiving investigative reports from finance, HR, and Smith, decided to fire everyone involved; Gorman was terminated July 7, 2010.
- Procedural posture: Gorman sued in Texas state court under the TCHRA for discrimination and retaliation (filed Nov. 19, 2010). She had an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing but not a TWC right-to-sue letter until after suit; Verizon removed to federal court; district court excused the late TWC letter and granted summary judgment to Verizon on retaliation. Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to receive a TWC right-to-sue letter before filing is jurisdictional or a waivable condition precedent | Gorman: her later receipt of the TWC right-to-sue cured any initial defect; the requirement is not jurisdictional | Verizon: absence of TWC right-to-sue at filing is jurisdictional and mandates dismissal | Failure to obtain the TWC right-to-sue is a condition precedent, not jurisdictional; later receipt cures defect |
| Whether Gorman established a prima facie retaliation claim (protected activity, adverse action, causation) | Gorman: she engaged in protected activity (opposed discrimination) and was later terminated; temporal and other factual links support causation | Verizon: termination was for independent, non-retaliatory reasons (involvement in commission scheme); decisionmaker lacked knowledge of her complaint; long time gap undermines causation | Gorman failed to show causation—ten-month gap and the decisionmaker’s lack of knowledge of her complaint; summary judgment proper |
| Whether a coworker’s knowledge of protected activity can supply causation when decisionmaker lacked such knowledge | Gorman: Smith knew (or could have learned) of the complaint and influenced termination | Verizon: Henze (the decisionmaker) was insulated by an independent investigation and was not a mere rubber stamp | Coworker influence insufficient: no evidence Henze was a rubber stamp or that Smith exercised controlling influence; independent investigation severs causal chain |
| Whether courts should harmonize TCHRA exhaustion rules with Title VII precedent | Gorman: follow federal approach treating right-to-sue as condition precedent cured by later receipt | Verizon: relies on earlier Texas cases treating exhaustion/jurisdiction more strictly | Court harmonized with federal law and Texas Supreme Court guidance in In re USAA—TCHRA right-to-sue not jurisdictional |
Key Cases Cited
- Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1991) (held earlier that TCHRA exhaustion/statute-of-limitations requirements were jurisdictional)
- In re USAA, 307 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2010) (overruled Schroeder’s jurisdictional treatment of limitations and directed harmonization with federal Title VII approaches)
- Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 235 F.3d 972 (5th Cir.) (applied Schroeder to treat TWC right-to-sue as jurisdictional)
- Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1982) (under Title VII, receipt of right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent that can be cured)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (established burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (a coworker’s animus can supply causation if it is a proximate cause of the adverse act or if the decisionmaker acts as a rubber stamp)