Ammons v. State
315 Ga. 149
Ga.2022Background
- Shortly after midnight on July 14, 2018, State Trooper Levi Perry stopped Mia Ammons for a nonworking tag light, detected alcohol odor, observed bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness, and learned she had been drinking earlier.
- Trooper Perry asked Ammons to submit to a portable preliminary breath (alco-sensor) test; she refused.
- Perry then administered an HGN check that Ammons briefly complied with (he reported 6/6 clues), and asked her to perform walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests, which she refused.
- Ammons was arrested, read implied-consent blood-test warnings, and refused consent to a warrantless blood draw.
- The trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence of her refusals (relying in part on Keenan v. State) and upheld admission of refusal-to-consent blood-test evidence under Georgia’s implied-consent statutes. The Supreme Court granted interlocutory review.
Issues
| Issue | Ammons' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Keenan v. State should be overruled insofar as it permits admission of refusal to take a preliminary alco-sensor test under the Georgia Constitution’s protection against compelled self-incrimination | Keenan is inconsistent with Olevik/Elliott/Awad; refusal to blow into any device is a protected, compelled, self-incriminating act and cannot be used at trial | Keenan remains controlling and distinguishes portable alco-sensor tests from the chemical breath/urine tests in Olevik/Elliott/Awad | Overruled to the extent it held otherwise; Paragraph XVI bars admission of evidence that a defendant refused a preliminary breath/alco-sensor test (refusal inadmissible) |
| Whether Paragraph XVI’s right against compelled self-incrimination covers field sobriety tests that require suspect cooperation (so refusal is inadmissible) | Field sobriety tests that require affirmative cooperation (HGN, walk-and-turn, one-leg-stand) generate incriminating evidence and are protected; refusals cannot be used | Such tests are non-testimonial, investigative, and relevant to probable cause and trial proof; Keenan and some appellate authority say non-custodial refusals are admissible | Paragraph XVI protects refusal to perform field sobriety tests that require cooperation; refusal evidence is inadmissible (court affirmed admission of voluntarily performed HGN but reversed admission of refusals to other cooperative field tests) |
| Whether to reconsider or overrule Olevik, Elliott, and Awad (which extend Paragraph XVI to compelled affirmative acts and bar using refusals) | Ammons: follow those precedents; they correctly interpret Paragraph XVI as protecting compelled acts that generate incriminating evidence | State and dissent urged reconsideration, arguing the text protects only "testimony" and prior cases misapplied interpretive canons | Court declined to overrule Olevik/Elliott/Awad and reaffirmed their application to cooperative, state-administered tests |
| Whether OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 and 40-6-392 (implied-consent rules allowing evidence of refusal to a warrantless blood test) violate Article I, § I, ¶ VII (Privileges and Immunities clause) | Paragraph VII imposes a duty on the General Assembly to protect citizens’ full enjoyment of rights and therefore precludes laws that burden constitutional rights; statutes permitting refusal evidence impermissibly burden rights | Statutes presumptively constitutional; Ammons must clearly show conflict with Paragraph VII; prior history and context do not support her expansive reading of Paragraph VII | Ammons failed to meet heavy burden; Court upheld statutes against the Paragraph VII challenge (did not hold refusal-evidence necessarily admissible in all contexts; evidentiary rules may still exclude it) |
Key Cases Cited
- Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 (2017) (Paragraph XVI protects against compelling affirmative acts that generate incriminating evidence; chemical breath test compulsion barred)
- Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 (2019) (reaffirmed Olevik and held the State may not use a defendant’s refusal to take a chemical breath test against them)
- Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99 (2022) (applied Olevik/Elliott to state-administered urine tests; refusal to produce sample inadmissible)
- Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569 (1993) (prior holding that noncustodial refusal of a roadside alco-sensor test could be admitted; overruled insofar as inconsistent with Paragraph XVI)
- State v. Bradberry, 357 Ga. App. 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (applied Olevik/Elliott to conclude evidence of refusal of an alco-sensor preliminary breath test violated Paragraph XVI)
- Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413 (1885) (early Georgia case construing self-incrimination provision narrowly to "testimony")
- Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879) (early decision often invoked in the Court’s historical line on compelled acts and evidence)
- Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679 (1916) (treated constitutional protection as coextensive with common-law privilege; influential in later precedent retained by the Court)