Ames v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732

Background

In 2007 Cindy and David Ames executed a security deed to WaMu for a $4.65M refinance; deed conveyed power of sale to WaMu and its "successors and assigns."
After WaMu failed in 2008 the FDIC as receiver entered a purchase-and-assumption transferring WaMu assets to Chase; a limited power of attorney from the FDIC to Chase was recorded and later (per the Ameses) expired in 2010.
Chase recorded an assignment of the Ameses’ security deed to itself in 2012; Chase then initiated a non-judicial foreclosure and retained counsel (Aldridge).
The Ameses sued in Georgia state court alleging the assignment to Chase was invalid and sought to stop foreclosure; the superior court dismissed for failure to state a claim based on Georgia Court of Appeals precedent.
The Ameses also litigated the matter in federal court (Florida); the district court and the Eleventh Circuit concluded the Ameses lacked standing to challenge the assignment.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding the Ameses lack standing to challenge the assignment and, alternatively, that the Eleventh Circuit decision precludes relitigation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a debtor has standing to challenge an assignment of a security deed	Ames: assignment to Chase was invalid (power of attorney expired) so Chase lacked authority to foreclose, giving Ames standing	Chase: assignment is authorized by statute and deed; debtor lacks injury from assignment and so lacks standing	Held: Ames lack standing to challenge assignment; debtors ordinarily cannot dispute assignments absent injury or other special circumstances
Preclusive effect of federal appellate decision	Ames: Eleventh Circuit judgment was not final under Georgia law and thus cannot preclude state litigation	Chase: Eleventh Circuit decided the standing question; federal decision has preclusive effect under federal/common‑law rules	Held: Eleventh Circuit’s ruling precludes relitigation under Florida/federal preclusion law (applied because federal case was in Florida)
Whether OCGA § 44-14-162.2(a) notice requirement gives debtor standing to dispute assignment	Ames: failure to receive notice from the true secured creditor (FDIC) injured them and confers standing	Chase: statute requires notice of who may negotiate, not proof the sender is the secured creditor; notice may be given by an authorized agent	Held: § 44-14-162.2(a) does not require the notice sender prove creditor status and does not confer standing to challenge assignment here
Whether debtor is an intended third‑party beneficiary of an assignment so may sue to invalidate it	Ames: assignment impacts their rights and thus they can contest its validity	Chase: assignment is contract between assignor and assignee; debtor is not a party nor intended beneficiary of assignment as a whole	Held: Debtor is not an intended third‑party beneficiary of assignment and generally cannot enforce or void assignments

Key Cases Cited

Montgomery v. Bank of Am., 321 Ga. App. 343 (Ga. Ct. App.) (Court of Appeals precedent holding debtors lack standing to challenge assignments)
Jurden v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 330 Ga. App. 179 (Ga. Ct. App.) (same rule on debtor standing to challenge assignment)
In re Cassell, 688 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.) (noting Georgia Supreme Court is ultimate arbiter of Georgia law)
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2001) (federal common law governs preclusive effect of federal judgments)
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (U.S. 2008) (rules on preclusion and issue preclusion principles)
You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 293 Ga. 67 (Ga.) (statute and cases explaining who qualifies as notifier/agent under OCGA § 44-14-162.2)
Greene v. Transp. Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 504 (Ga. Ct. App.) (Georgia rule that judgment is suspended while appeal pending)
Calhoun First Nat’l Bank v. Dickens, 264 Ga. 285 (Ga.) (recognizing wrongful-foreclosure duty to exercise power of sale fairly)