American Petroleum Institute v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 404 U.S. App. D.C. 407

Petitioners challenge the SEC rule implementing Dodd-Frank § 13(q) requiring resource extraction issuers to disclose payments to foreign governments for oil, gas, or minerals, asserting First Amendment and statutory flaws.
Petitioners filed a petition for review in the DC Circuit and, out of caution, a separate district-court suit; intervenor Oxfam America challenges the DC Circuit’s jurisdiction.
Section 25(a) bars district-court review of final orders; Section 25(b) covers certain rules, but petitioners’ rule does not fall within the enumerated provisions.
The SEC rule relied on subsection 15(d) rather than the enumerated subsections in §25(b), creating a jurisdictional question since §25(b) governs initial appellate review of rules only when tied to enumerated provisions.
Historical analysis shows Congress added §25(b) in 1975 to restrict initial appellate review to certain rules and later added §25(b) again for the Market Reform Act; the challenged rule is not listed in §25(b).
The court concludes it lacks jurisdiction and dismisses the petition for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to district-court proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the DC Circuit has jurisdiction to review the SEC rule under §25(a) or §25(b).	Petitioners rely on Investment Company Institute to broaden §25(a) review to rules.	The rule is not within §25(a) or §25(b) because §13(q) regulations are not tied to enumerated §25(b) provisions.	Lack of jurisdiction; §25(b) governs only enumerated rules, §13(q) not listed.
Whether Investment Company Institute and Lorion compel a different jurisdictional reading.	Investment Company Institute allows review of agency action on the administrative record; Lorion favors initial appellate review when appropriate.	These cases do not apply because §25(b) is explicit and §13(q) is not within §25(b); Lorion does not override the statute here.	Not controlling; Congress’s explicit scheme governs; no jurisdiction under §25(a) or §25(b).
Does a clerical error in renumbering §9(h)(2) to §9(i)(2) create ambiguity that triggers Lorion-based jurisdictional relief?	A scrivener’s error could imply an ambiguity that allows initial appellate review in the court of appeals.	Clerical errors do not alter the statutory scheme; there is no congressional hint of broader §25 jurisdiction.	No ambiguity; clerical error does not negate the jurisdictional framework.

Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (choices of court for review under direct-review statutes)
Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (order versus record for jurisdictional purposes)
Lorion Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (U.S. 1985) (limits on presuming initial appellate review absent congressional intent)
Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v. Department of Transportation, 854 F.2d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (policy of initial appellate review aligned with congressional intent)
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (U.S. 2009) (interpretation of statutory text and purpose governs jurisdiction)
PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973) (historical basis for review of agency rules)
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (jurisdictional prudence in agency review questions)
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (extra-record evidence exception discussed in review context)
National Automobile Dealers Association v. FTC, 670 F.3d 268 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (acknowledges district court review pathway when jurisdiction uncertain)
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (U.S. 1979) (assumes Congress knows court interpretations but not controlling here)