American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations v. City of Miami, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6825

In November 2003, Miami hosted FTAA negotiations; AFL-CIO, FLARA, and listed employees planned protests and coordinated with city authorities to obtain permits and routes, affirming lawful demonstrations.
Police prepared with mutual aid from regional agencies and training to handle large crowds, while AFL-CIO sought to minimize disruption and discourage disobedience by others.
Protests culminated in a Bayfront Park rally and a march on November 20, 2003, with incidents including police detentions, guns drawn on Dion and Cavanaugh, and pepper-spray exposure of Thea Lee.
Plaintiffs alleged City of Miami and MPD officials (Timoney, Fernandez, Cannon) violated First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under §1983, asserting municipal policy, supervisory, and training deficiencies.
District court granted summary judgment for defendants on most claims and dismissed the AFL-CIO’s declaratory/injunctive claims as moot; Count 16 Fourteenth Amendment claims were also dismissed as to qualified immunity.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part, concluding no genuine issues of material fact existed and that declaratory/injunctive claims were moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are the AFL-CIO's declaratory/injunctive claims justiciable?	AFL-CIO intends future, ongoing protests and seeks relief.	Past events and post-2008 plans render claims moot; no ongoing controversy.	Moot; no jurisdiction to consider.
Did the City policies or Timoney’s actions causally violate constitutional rights for municipal liability?	Policies and Timoney’s adoption caused First/Fourth/Fourteenth violations.	Policies were facially lawful and not shown to cause violations with deliberate indifference.	No causal link shown; summary judgment affirmed.
Was the failure-to-train/supervise theory adequately supported to impose municipal liability?	CIP and DOJ reports show notice of training deficiencies and need to act.	Notice alone is insufficient without evidence of deliberate indifference and action.	No deliberate indifference shown; summary judgment affirmed.
Do supervisory and civil-conspiracy theories survive summary judgment against individual defendants?	Supervisors knew or directed unlawful conduct; conspiracy evidence exists.	No evidence of personal participation, knowledge, or agreement to violate rights.	Lack of evidence; supervisory and conspiracy claims affirmed as insufficient.

Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1998) (deliberate indifference required for failure-to-train liability)
Brown v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1997) (deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability)
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (U.S. 1989) (policy must be moving force behind injury; causation framework)
Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (due-process claim elements under §1983)
Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2001) (procedural due process pleading standards)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (U.S. 1978) (procedural due process aims to protect from unjust deprivation)
Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (U.S. 1900) (jurisdictional question and mootness principles)
Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (circumstantial proof of conspiracy in §1983)
Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor and Emp't Sec., 133 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1998) (supervisory liability and causation under §1983)