Amended August 21, 2014 Ned Chiodo v. The Section 43.24 Panel Consisting of: Secretary of State Matthew Schultz, Auditor of State Mary Mosiman and Attorney General Thomas Miller
2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 41
| Iowa | 2014Background
- Bisignano filed affine candidacy for Iowa Senate in District 17; Chiodo objected based on prior OWI second offense conviction.
- Bisignano was convicted of OWI, second offense, on December 9, 2013; sentence included a two-year term with most incarceration suspended and probation for two years.
- Panel denied Chiodo’s objection on March 21, 2014; Chiodo sought judicial review in district court, which affirmed the Panel.
- Chiodo appeals, arguing AG should have recused and that OWI, second offense, is an infamous crime disqualifying candidacy under Iowa Constitution article II, section 5.
- Court reviews de novo the constitutional issue; affirms district court and holds OWI, second offense, is not an infamous crime disqualifying Bisignano from office.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OWI second offense is an infamous crime | Chiodo contends OWI second offense is infamous and disqualifies candidacy. | Bisignano contends OWI second offense is not infamous; not disqualifying. | OWI second offense is not an infamous crime under article II, §5. |
| Whether the undisputed historic definitions govern the scope of infamous crimes | Chiodo relies on traditional definitions equating infamous crimes with penitentiary punishment. | Bisignano argues modern constitutional evolution and textual analysis limit application to felonies; the legislature’s definition is not controlling. | The court rejects Blodgett/Flannagan Haubrich as controlling; adopts text-and-history approach distinguishing felony from infamous crime. |
| Whether legislative definition Iowa Code § 39.3(8) can constrain constitutional meaning | Chiodo endorses legislative definition equating infamous crime with a felony. | Bisignano argues legislature cannot redefine infamous crimes to constrain the constitution. | Legislative definition may be considered, but cannot override constitutional meaning; OWI second offense remains non-infamous. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 248 Iowa 978 (Iowa 1957) (infamous crime defined by imprisonment in penitentiary for voting eligibility)
- Blodgett v. Clarke, 177 Iowa 575 (Iowa 1916) (infamous crime defined as punishable by penitentiary confinement)
- Flannagan v. Jepson, 177 Iowa 393 (Iowa 1916) (infamous crime concept tied to punishment; foundational historic view)
- Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. 2011) (state regulatory view of Infamous Crimes Clause; depends on crime's nature)
- Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (U.S. 1885) (historical infamy concepts related to punishment and witness disqualification)