177 Iowa 393 | Iowa | 1916
A decree was entered in November, 1911, enjoining the plaintiff herein from maintaining a, liquor nuisance. In December, 1914, an information was filed accusing him of violating the terms of said decree, and after hearing he was found guilty and punished for contempt. Thereafter, in October, 1915, a second information accusing him of violating the said decree was filed and a trial had and the defendant found guilty. The judgment previously referred to was introduced in evidence, and the defendant sentenced to serve' a period of one year in the penitentiary at Fort Madison at hard labor. This sentence was in pursuance of Section 2461-m of the Supplemental Supplement to the Code, 1915, which provides that a person who, after one conviction upon a criminal charge for violation of the liquor law, shall be again indicted, tried and convicted for a subsequent offense against the same statute, shall be classed as a persistent violator and be imprisoned in the state penitentiary or reformatory for not more than one year; and Section 2407 thereof, which provides that a person who has once been found guilty of contempt for violating a liquor injunction shall, for each subsequent violation, be punished by a fine of not less than $500 or more than $1,000, or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary or state reformatory at hard labor for not more than one year. In other words, when these enactments are read in the light of the repeated holdings of this court that contempt is not a prime, and that punishment imposed and suffered for contempt in no manner relieves a party from his liability to prosecution and punishment under an indictment for the same act, it follows that this defendant, having once been convicted and once enjoined, may, upon a second conviction, be committed to the penitentiary at hard labor for one year, and, having served his time, may emerge from prison to be met at the door by the sheriff armed with a writ for his arrest for' contempt, and upon order of the court, without trial by jury, be condemned to return to the penitentiary for another full year at hard labor.
“Article 1, Section 10. In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life or liberty of an individual, the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.”
“Article 1, Section 23. There shall be no slavery in this state; nor shall there be involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crime.”
' The petitioner also invokes the protection of the provision found in both the Constitution of the state and the Constitution of the United States, providing that excessive fines shall not be imposed and cruel and inhuman punishments shall not be' inflicted. (Constitution of Iowa, Article 1, Section 17; Constitution of the United States, 8th Amendment; also the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.) Defendant contends that the right to invoke the protection of the provision of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting involuntary servitude, except for crimes of which the person has been duly convicted, and the similar provision of our state Constitution, has been decided by us adversely to the petitioner’s claims, but this is clearly beside the mark; as will be seen by reference to Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286. The question here raised was neither considered nor decided in that case. The defendant^ Blattner, had been enjoined, and appealed from the decree rendered against him. Among other defenses argued by him was that the statute providing for an injunction was void because it provided a penalty of jail imprisonment, and was, therefore, in conflict with the constitutional prohibition of involuntary servitude. In overruling the point, the court well said:
“It is impossible to discover reasons for holding that an imprisonment for a contempt is a servitude.” .
No such claim is made in the instant case. -It is not here argued, that mere imprisonment for contempt constitutes “involuntary servitude.” The objection is directed against
‘ ‘ There is nothing better settled than that enforced labor is ‘involuntary servitude’ within the meaning of such constitutional provisions. ”
So, also, it has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States that, “Imprisonment at hard labor ... is, in the strongest sense of the words, ‘involuntary servitude for crime.’ ” Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417.
This definition of the phrase being established — that imprisonment at hard labor by the judgment or sentence of a court is involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Constitution — it follows, of. necessity, that the sentence pronounced upon the petitioner and the statutory provision which authorizes it are both invalid, unless we are able to say that such penalty was imposed as a punishment for crime. This we cannot say without repudiating and overruling a long line of our precedents, extending from earliest history of this state to the present day, declaring contempt of court, in the disobeying of its decree, to be in the nature of, but not, a crime. See Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488; Martin v. Blattner, 68
“A sentence to the state prison, for any term of time, must be considered as falling within the meaning of infamous punishment. The convict is placed in a public place of punishment, common to the whole state, subject to solitary imprisonment, to have his hair cropped, to be clothed in conspicuous prison dress, subjected to hard labor without pay, to hard fare, coarse and meager food, and to severe discipline. . . . Besides, the state prison, for any term of time, is now substituted for all the ignominious punishments formerly in use; and, unless this is infamous, then there is no infamous punishment, other than capital.”
The authorities may be searched in vain for any precedent under our constitutional form of government holding it to be in the power of a state to clothe its courts with authority to visit infamous punishment upon any person for contempt, or in any proceeding whatever other than the orderly process of trial upon indictment or information. The authority to punish for contempt is, of course, quite indispensable to the orderly and efficient administration of justice, but the very fact that such authority is subject to no appeal, and its application is summary to a degree, bordering on the arbitrary,
To recapitulate: A sentence to infamous punishment in the penitentiary at hard labor can be lawfully imposed, under our Constitution, only as punishment for crime of.which the accused has been duly convicted; one is not duly convicted of crime except in a proceeding giving opportunity for a jury trial; a charge of contempt not being a charge of crime triable by jury, the court is without power or authority in such proceeding to penalize ¿lie contempt by imposing a sentence which is constitutionally restricted to cases of conviction for crime.
The wording of the. act amending Section 2407 of the Code is as follows:
“.Section 1. That section two thousand four hundred and seven (2407) of the Code be’and same is hereby amended by inserting after the word ‘shall’ in the 10th line thereof the following ‘fob the first offense’ and by adding thereto the following: ‘A party who, having once been found guilty of contempt for violating the provisions of any such injunction, shall for each such subsequent violation be punished by a fine of not less than $500 or more than $1,000 or by imprisonment
The parts of this amendment are so intimately connected that it is hardly conceivable that the legislature would have adopted one without the other. One purpose is manifested, and that is to enhance the severity of the punishment for violations subsequent to the first.