955 F.3d 908
11th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs Dr. Amanda Lawson‑Ross and Tristian Byrne had federal student loans serviced by Great Lakes and were told by Great Lakes representatives they were on track for Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF). Years of payments later they learned most of their loans were FFEL loans (not Federal Direct Loans) and thus ineligible for PSLF unless consolidated. They allege reliance on Great Lakes’ advice and resulting harm.
- Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under Florida law (including FCCPA, negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty), alleging affirmative misrepresentations by the servicer about PSLF eligibility.
- Great Lakes moved to dismiss, arguing the Higher Education Act (HEA) § 1098g expressly preempts state-law disclosure claims; it also relied on a DOE Notice interpreting § 1098g and argued claims sounding in fraud required Rule 9(b) pleading.
- The district court dismissed, concluding plaintiffs’ claims were effectively nondisclosure claims preempted by § 1098g and gave deference to the DOE Notice.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed: it held § 1098g preempts only state-law disclosure requirements tied to the HEA’s specified disclosure scheme (§ 1083), not affirmative, voluntary misrepresentations by servicers; it also rejected implied (conflict or field) preemption and gave the DOE Notice little weight. The case was vacated and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether HEA § 1098g expressly preempts plaintiffs’ state‑law claims alleging affirmative misrepresentations about PSLF eligibility | Plaintiffs: claims allege voluntary false statements, not breaches of any HEA disclosure duty; §1098g therefore does not preempt | Great Lakes: claims are disguised failures to disclose that would impose state disclosure duties preempted by §1098g; DOE Notice supports this | Held: Express preemption does not apply. §1098g preempts only state disclosure requirements tied to the disclosures the HEA actually mandates (§1083); voluntary affirmative misrepresentations are not within that domain |
| Whether Ninth Circuit’s Chae controls (i.e., similar misrepresentation claims are preempted) | Plaintiffs: Chae involved required HEA disclosures; it’s distinguishable | Great Lakes: Chae is persuasive and analogous | Held: Chae is distinguishable and not persuasive here because it targeted required HEA disclosures, whereas these claims challenge voluntary, affirmative statements |
| Whether state-law claims are conflict‑preempted because they frustrate HEA objectives (uniformity) | Plaintiffs: prohibiting false statements does not undermine uniform HEA disclosures; duty not to deceive is compatible with federal aims | Great Lakes: allowing claims would disrupt uniform administration and create nonuniform duties | Held: No conflict preemption. HEA’s text and purposes do not show a congressional intent to preempt state tort claims aimed at false voluntary statements; even assuming a uniformity interest, forbidding affirmative misrepresentations does not frustrate it |
| Whether HEA implicitly occupies the field of student‑loan regulation (field preemption) | Plaintiffs: HEA does not occupy the field; express preemptions imply Congress did not intend broader preemption | Great Lakes: the HEA is comprehensive and federal interests (including contractor relationships) support field preemption | Held: No field preemption. The HEA’s regulatory scheme is not so comprehensive as to displace state common‑law remedies; prior precedent rejects field preemption here |
Key Cases Cited
- Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing HEA purpose to expand access to higher education)
- Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010) (held certain borrower claims challenging how servicers communicated information required by federal law were preempted)
- Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2019) (distinguished required disclosures from voluntary misrepresentations; found voluntary‑statement claims not preempted)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (U.S. 1992) (preemption principles; distinction between duty to disclose and duty not to deceive)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (U.S. 1944) (framework for deference to agency guidance based on persuasiveness)
- Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2004) (HEA does not occupy the field of debt‑collection/consumer protection)
- N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (U.S. 1973) (comprehensive federal regulation does not automatically preempt state law)
- Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (U.S. 1988) (preemption test where uniquely federal interests and contractor liability are implicated)
- Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2017) (standard of review and presumption against preemption in areas traditionally regulated by states)